Nuclear Fuel Fabrication - Current Issues (USA) 
(last updated 6 Jun 2013)
Contents:
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> See also Regulatory Issues - USA
Mitsubishi and Areva to build nuclear fuel fabrication plant in USA
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. 
(MHI) and Areva confirmed they are doing necessary preparation to jointly invest (MHI 50% and Areva 50%) in a dedicated nuclear fuel fabrication facility to be built in the United States.
(Areva, Mitsubishi Feb. 18, 2009)
TVEL aims to sell nuclear fuel in the US market by 2014
> See here
(for UF6 transport, see extra page)
Truck carrying uranium fuel rods wrecked in Tennessee
A truck carrying uranium fuel rods was struck from behind by another vehicle on I-40 westbound near U.S. Highway 64 Tuesday (Nov. 15) night at 7:50 p.m.
Hazmat crews, Tennessee Highway Patrol, Memphis police and Memphis fire personnel responded quickly.
No fuel rods fell off the truck.
Emergency crews were relieved no one was hurt and that no spill occurred.
(WREG-TV Nov. 15, 2011)
Truck hauling low-grade uranium overturns on U.S. highway exit in North Carolina
On Dec. 21, 2006, a tractor-trailer hauling about 6,000 pounds (2,700 kilograms) of low-grade uranium overturned as it exited a major U.S. interstate highway south of Raleigh, North Carolina, but the crash did not pose a threat to the public, authorities said.
The truck crashed onto its side after the driver lost control on an exit ramp along Interstate 95, said Jason Barbour, Johnston County's emergency communications director.
The truck was carrying a radioactive material called packaged fissile, Highway Patrol spokesman Lt. Everett Clendenin said. The powdered uranium was packed in containers that weren't breached by the accident, he said.
The uranium was being transported by Portsmouth Marine Terminal, from Portsmouth, Virginia, to Global Nuclear Fuels in Wilmington, North Carolina.
(The International Herald Tribune Dec. 22, 2006)
Truck carrying nuclear fuel assemblies overturned on Interstate 80 in Utah
On June 8, 2004, at 5:30 am EDT, a tractor trailer carrying a sea land container which contained twelve recently manufactured fuel assemblies overturned on Interstate 80 at mile marker 34 in Tooele County, Utah. The unirradiated fuel assemblies were being transported from GNF's nuclear fuel facility in Wilmington, North Carolina, to Oakland, California for shipment to Japan. The licensee reported that both drivers were injured but there did not appear to be any damage to the overturned sea land container.
(NRC PNO-II-04-004, June 8, 2004)
The shipment was driven back to Wilmington. GNF performed a limited visual inspection of the RAJ-II containers that could be seen through the open top and doors of the sea land, and stated there did not appear to be any significant damage to these containers. GNF plans to unload the sea land container and fully inspect the RAJ-II packages.
(NRC PNO-II-04-004A, June 14, 2004)
Project On Government Oversight demands more efforts for downblending of U.S. surplus weapons-grade uranium for reactor use
On Sep. 14, 2010, the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) released U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: How the Country Can Profit and Become More Secure by Getting Rid of Its Surplus Weapons-Grade Uranium, an investigative report which has found that the Obama Administration's efforts of securing and disposing of bomb-grade material around the world is not being realized here in the U.S.
The U.S. has nearly 400 metric tons (MT) of highly enriched uranium (HEU), a fissile material used in nuclear weapons, that is not necessary for U.S. defense needs, the vast majority of which has not been declared surplus so that it can be properly eliminated. This is the equivalent of more than 16,000 nuclear warheads.
Although not necessary for defense purposes, this vast store of HEU could be used for nefarious purposes by terrorists.
Despite this danger, one of the most practical ways of reducing the risk has fallen by the wayside. The pace of converting surplus, expensive-to-secure HEU into low enriched uranium (LEU), which is unusable in weapons, has slowed to a snail's pace.
As recently as 2004, this process-known as downblending-was occurring at a rate close to ten times that of the downblending rate planned for the next four decades. The reason for the slow-down appears to be that the Department of Energy (DOE) has not made downblending a priority.
The U.S. government has the capacity to ramp up downblending of surplus HEU to previous levels, and even exceed them. Also, far more HEU can be declared surplus than has been.
> View POGO release Sep. 14, 2010
> Download POGO report U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: How the Country Can Profit and Become More Secure by Getting Rid of Its Surplus Weapons-Grade Uranium, Sep. 14, 2010
U.S. DOE awards further contract for downblending of U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for commercial reactor use
On June 23, 2009, DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced that it has awarded a $209 million contract to down-blend 12.1 metric tons (MT) of surplus U.S. highly enriched uranium (HEU) and store the resulting low-enriched uranium (LEU).
Under the agreement, 12.1 metric tons of HEU will be down-blended to about 220 metric tons of LEU at the Nuclear Fuel Services facility in Erwin, Tennessee. The resulting LEU will have a market value of more than $400 million. NNSA expects the down-blending to begin in 2009 and to be completed in 2012. The contractors performing the down-blending work will be compensated with a fraction of the LEU; the remainder of the LEU will be stored to support the mixed oxide (MOX) program for disposition of surplus weapons plutonium.
DOE presents downblending options for its unallocated HEU
DOE is considering to "Down-blend 12.1 metric tons of uranium (MTU) of unallocated highly enriched uranium (HEU) to about 220 MTU of LEU of which about 170 MTU could be used for a general or special-purpose DOE LEU inventory." (Excess Uranium Inventory Management Plan, Dec. 16, 2008)
> See also: DOE issues Excess Uranium Inventory Management Plan
In October 2007, DOE released a supplement analysis for its Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/EIS-0240, June 1996. This supplement analysis (SA) summarizes the status of HEU disposition activities conducted to date and evaluates the potential impacts of continued program implementation. In addition, this SA considers the potential environmental impacts of proposed new DOE/NNSA initiatives to support the surplus HEU disposition program. Specifically, DOE/NNSA is proposing new end-users for existing program material,
new disposal pathways for existing program HEU discard material, and down-blending additional quantities of HEU.
> Download Supplement Analysis for the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium, DOE/EIS-0240-SA1, October 2007 (181k PDF)
U.S. DOE awards contract for downblending of U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for commercial reactor use
On June 29, 2007, the Department of Energy awarded a contract to convert 17.4 metric tons of bomb-grade uranium stored in Tennessee into low-enriched fuel for civilian reactors overseas.
The highly enriched material is now held at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant in Oak Ridge. It will be diluted or "downblended" at Nuclear Fuels Services in Erwin, Tennessee, then shipped for storage to Westinghouse Electric Company's fuel fabrication plant in Columbia, South Carolina.
The downblending work at Nuclear Fuel Services is to begin later this year and be completed by 2010.
(AP Jun 29, 2007)
DOE plans downblending of enriched uranium for reactor fuel
More than 17 tons of highly enriched uranium currently stored at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant will be "down-blended" to eliminate its weapons capability and make it available for reactor fuel.
The government unveiled the three-year project earlier this week, and in December 2006 or January 2007 will solicit companies interested in bidding on the work.
According to the U.S. Department of Energy, the 17.4 short tons [15.8 t] of HEU will be converted into about 290 short tons [263 t] of low-enriched uranium with an estimated value of $750 million. The uranium stocks to be used in the down-blending project have an enrichment that ranges from about 20 percent up to 93.3 percent. The materials will be mixed with lesser stocks of uranium to reduce the enrichment to 4.95 percent U-235, a level suitable for use in commercial power reactors.
(The Knoxville News Sentinel Nov. 11, 2006)
> View: Presolicitation Notice - Down Blend of Highly Enriched Uranium and Establishment of Reliable Fuel Supply, Nov. 8, 2006
BWX Technologies completes downblending of weapons-grade uranium
Two private companies announced on July 13, 2006, they have finished converting 50 metric tons of weapons-suitable highly enriched uranium to uranium that can be used by commercial nuclear power plants.
The conversion by mixing the highly enriched uranium with depleted uranium was conducted by BWX Technologies at its facility in Lynchburg, Va., for the USEC Inc., the uranium enrichment company that supplies reactor fuel for the nuclear industry.
About 660 metric tons of low-enriched uranium was produced and already has been provided to dozens of utilities to be used in power reactors.
Separately, the Energy Department is providing 39 tons of highly enriched uranium to the Tennessee Valley Authority, which, after converting it (at NFS' Erwin Tn., plant), uses it in TVA's power reactors. About half of that amount already has been converted.
(AP July 14, 2006)
DOE to release 20 Metric Tons of Highly Enriched Uranium for Downblending
On Nov. 7, 2005, Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced that the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove up to 200 metric tons (MT) of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), in the coming decades, from further use as fissile material in U.S. nuclear weapons and prepare this material for other uses.
About 20 MT will be down-blended to low enriched uranium (LEU) for eventual use in civilian nuclear power reactors, research reactors or related research. The other material will be used for Naval Reactors or for Space Programs.
(DOE Nov. 7, 2005)
DOE considers downblending of 100 short tons of HEU stored at Oak Ridge, Tennessee
Hearing: DOE Nuclear Security: What Are the Challenges, and What's Next?
U.S. House of Representatives, The Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, May 11, 2004:
Witness Testimony: The Honorable Kyle E. McSlarrow, Deputy Secretary, US Department of Energy
"[...] Third, we need to explore whether we can down-blend
substantial quantities of our HEU holdings. Potentially, this
could yield a number of security benefits, but the
programmatic impact of a major campaign of down-blending
needs to be assessed. We have also directed NNSA to
conduct a study to assess the down-blending of large
quantities, perhaps as much as 100 tons, of the HEU stored
at Y-12 and to assess the programmatic impacts of such a
large campaign."
DOE/EIS-0240 - Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement, (June 1996)
> Download DOE/EIS-0240 Summary, 1996 (5MB PDF - FAS)
> View DOE Record of Decision (Federal Register: August 5, 1996 (Volume 61, Number 151) p. 40619-40629):
"SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) has decided to implement a
program to make surplus highly enriched uranium (HEU) non-weapons-usable by blending it down to low-enriched uranium (LEU), as specified
in the Preferred Alternative in the Disposition of Surplus Highly
Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement (HEU Final EIS,
DOE/EIS-0240, June 1996). DOE will gradually sell up to 85 percent of
the resulting LEU over time for commercial use as fuel feed for nuclear
power plants to generate electricity (including 50 metric tons of HEU
and 7,000 tons of natural uranium that will be transferred to the
United States Enrichment Corporation), and will dispose of the
remaining LEU as low-level radioactive waste. This program applies to a
nominal 200 metric tons of United States-origin HEU that the President
has declared, or may declare, surplus to defense needs. [...]"
> See also:
- Uranium Downblending · Uranium Downblending Calculator
- USEC : Megatons to Megawatts · USEC-DOE HEU PROGRAM
- U.S. Higly Enriched Uranium Disposition (NTI)
- DOE Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition Program Office
- DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (?)
- Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking A Balance - A Historical Report on the United States Highly Enriched Uranium Production, Acquisition, and Utilization Activities from 1945 through September 30, 1996 , U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, January 2001 (released on FOIA request)
- HEU downblending at Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina
- NFS Blended Low-Enrichment Uranium (BLEU) project, Erwin, Tennessee
- Downblending of Highly Enriched Uranium at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
- Downblending of Russian HEU for use in U.S. nuclear power plants
NRC License No. SNM-1097, Docket No. 07001113
Aerial View: Google Maps · MSRMaps
> See also: GE Silex laser isotope separation enrichment demonstration facility project in Wilmington, North Carolina
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
"On October 26, 2011 at approximately 3:00 p.m., a deficiency was identified during a routine criticality safety review of a proposed revision to an operating procedure for transporting and storing 3-gallon cans. One of the controls needed to meet double contingency was not available to restrict the movement of cans that exceed the specified mass limit for these storage locations. This resulted in a condition where the mass control documented in the criticality safety analysis had not been maintained. The second control, geometry, was maintained."
(Event Number: 47380, NRC Event Notification Report for October 28, 2011)
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
On Sep. 15, 2011, GNF reported a failure to maintain double contingency criteria:
"During a GNF-A Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) team walk-down of HVAC systems in the decontamination facility area, it was observed that a log entry for a waste-oil can mass was greater than the limit specified in procedural requirements.
Upon further investigation it was determined at 3:30PM on September 14, 2011 that an operator had incorrectly processed a waste oil can with a gross weight in excess of the limit specified by criticality safety requirements. This resulted in a condition where one of the two controls on mass documented as being necessary to meet double contingency had not been maintained. The second criticality control on mass was maintained at all times."
> View NRC Event Notification Report for September 16, 2011
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
On Sep. 14, 2011, GNF reported a potential failure to maintain double contingency criteria:
"As part of the ongoing GNF-A Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) project, reviews of documentation for scrap accumulation hoods were performed that identified procedural actions that were different than described in the criticality safety analysis. It was determined at approximately 2:45 PM on September 13, 2011 that uranium mixed with small amounts of moderator were not prevented from movement into these hoods. This resulted in a condition where the moderation criticality control documented as being necessary to meet double contingency may not have been maintained. The other criticality control on geometry was maintained at all times. [...]"
> View NRC Event Notification Report for September 15, 2011
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant; NRC proposes $17,500 penalty
On March 2, 2011, the NRC was notified through Event Notification 46650 that GNF-A had
failed to maintain mass control of UO2 powder in the sinter test grinding station HEPA filter enclosure. Specifically, on March 1, 2011, GNF staff identified that approximately 46 kilograms of UO2 powder had been present in the sinter test grinder filter housing, which was greater than the analyzed safe mass to prevent a criticality.
Based on the results of an inspection conducted March 14 - 18, 2011, the NRC has determined that two Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements occurred.
(NRC Special Inspection Report and Notice of Violation, June 29, 2011, ADAMS Acc. No. ML111810118 )
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed a $17,500 civil penalty against Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas LLC in Wilmington, N.C., for violations of NRC requirements related to a March incident at the fuel manufacturing facility.
The violations involved a failure of Global Nuclear Fuel’s staff to maintain mass control of uranium oxide in particulate air filters in one area of the facility.
> Download NRC news release Nov. 15, 2011 (PDF)
> Download Notice of Violation EA-11-095, Nov. 14, 2011 (PDF)
NRC finds two violations at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
During an NRC inspection conducted February 22-26, 2010, two violations of NRC
requirements were identified: the licensee failed to report within 24 hours
of discovery, a loss or degradation of an item relied on for criticality safety, and, the licensee failed to install automatic fire detection equipment in the Process Technology laboratory area where fire hazards were present. (ADAMS Acc. No. ML100850027 )
NRC finds five apparent violations at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
During inspections conducted from November 7, 2008, through August 28, 2009, five apparent violations were identified and are being considered for escalated enforcement action. The apparent violations involve the failure to identify credible accident scenarios during process hazard analyses or document them in the Integrated Safety Analysis Reference Report; the failure to identify criticality accident scenarios as high consequence events; and three separate failures to designate controls as items relied on for safety.
"The apparent violations are of concern to the NRC because they appear to indicate a programmatic issue with your Integrated Safety Analysis. Specifically, these apparent violations indicate a systematic and consistent failure to identify and categorize accident sequences and declare items relied on for safety in accordance with your Integrated Safety Analysis methodology and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 70." (NRC letter to GNF, Nov. 6, 2009, ADAMS Acc. No. ML093100078 )
Violation of criticality rules at GNF Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has established a Special Inspection Team at the Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas commercial nuclear fuel plant near Wilmington, N.C., to inspect and assess facts and circumstances associated with an event in which moisture was detected on Jan. 30, 2008, in a process vessel which should not have contained moisture so as to prevent a nuclear criticality.
> View NRC release Feb. 1, 2008
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has proposed a $16,250 civil penalty against Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas, L.L.C., for incorrectly categorizing an emergency level declaration during a Jan. 30, 2008, incident at the plant's low-enriched uranium processing line in Wilmington, N.C.
> View NRC release Aug. 14, 2008
GNF requests 40-year license renewal for Wilmington nuclear fuel plant
On April 2, 2007, Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas, L.L.C., requested a 40-year license renewal for its Wilmington nuclear fuel plant, North Carolina.
Notice of License Renewal Request for Global Nuclear Fuel -- Americas, LLC, Wilmington, North Carolina, and Opportunity To Request a Hearing.
A request for a hearing must be filed by August 17, 2007.
Federal Register: June 18, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 116) p. 33539-33541 (download full text )
On June 25, 2009, NRC approved the requested license renewal for the continued operation of GNF's Wilmington nuclear fuel plant for 40 years. No hearing requests were
received.
Federal Register: July xx, 2009 (Volume 74, Number xx) p. xx
NRC License No. SNM-1107, Docket No. 07001151
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NRC to hold meeting on seismic and criticality prevention programs at Westinghouse Electric Co. Columbia nuclear fuel plant
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has scheduled a meeting for Tuesday, Jan. 8, 2013 to discuss ongoing programs of interest at the Westinghouse Fuel Facility, which is located near Columbia, S.C.
At the meeting, Westinghouse officials will discuss the facility's seismic program, including the results of an independent consultant's review of how the plant would respond to an earthquake.
Westinghouse will also discuss the status of its ongoing project to enhance safety and improve procedures to prevent nuclear criticalities.
> Download NRC release Dec. 28, 2012 (PDF)
Westinghouse requests 40-year license renewal for Columbia nuclear fuel plant
On Nov. 30, 2012, - only three months after NRC granted a 15-year license renewal (!) - Westinghouse Electric Co requested a 40-year license renewal for its Columbia nuclear fuel plant.
On Feb. 7, 2013, NRC notified Westinghouse that it plans to defer the review of the
application until January 2014.
NRC grants 15-year license renewal for Westinghouse Electric Co Columbia nuclear fuel plant
Westinghouse Electric Company submitted a revised license application dated March 20, 2012.
On Aug. 8, 2012, NRC granted a 15-year license renewal.
Violation of criticality rules at WEC Columbia nuclear fuel plant, South Carolina
On Feb. 25, 2011, NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Westinghouse Electric Company for violations of criticality protection rules identified at its Columiba nuclear fuel plant.
Spill at WEC Columbia nuclear fuel plant, South Carolina
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has dispatched a Special Inspection Team to the Westinghouse commercial nuclear fuel plant near Columbia, S.C., to review the circumstances associated with a Jan. 24 event involving a spill of about 200 gallons of wastewater containing ammonia and low levels of uranium.
The spill was the result of a pump failure and operators shut down the process after a few minutes. Plant employees cleaned the area, no workers were exposed to significant concentrations and no medical attention was needed. Westinghouse reported the event to the NRC on Jan. 25 and the NRC staff decided that a special inspection to review the facts surrounding the event, assess the Westinghouse response and evaluate the company's corrective actions was the appropriate course of action.
> View NRC release Feb. 1, 2010
NRC proposes $17,500 fine against Westinghouse for violations at Columbia nuclear fuel plant:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has proposed a $17,500 civil penalty
against Westinghouse Electric Company for violations of nuclear safety requirements at its
commercial nuclear fuel plant in Columbia, S.C.
NRC officials said the proposed civil penalty is based on violations identified during an
NRC review of a Jan. 24, 2010 event involving a spill inside the plant of about 200 gallons of
wastewater containing ammonia and low levels of uranium.
> Download NRC release Nov. 4, 2010 (PDF)
Nuclear fuel pellets missing from WEC Columbia nuclear fuel plant, South Carolina
The operators of a Bluff Road nuclear fuel plant can't find 25 pounds of radioactive material - and federal investigators say that's a problem.
Officials with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission suspect someone at the Westinghouse nuclear fuel factory deliberately moved uranium fuel pellets without properly accounting for them. Neither Westinghouse nor the NRC has been able to pinpoint the person.
Investigators say the fuel pellets, first reported missing in May, pose little danger to the public because the material likely never left the site. The pellets were probably recycled in the fuel plant, according to the NRC.
(The State Oct. 2, 2009)
> View NRC release Sep. 17, 2009
> Download Notice of Violation and NRC Inspection Report , Oct. 15, 2010
U.S. NRC issues Confirmatory Order regarding falsifications at Westinghouse Electric Company's Columbia nuclear fuel facility
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a Confirmatory Order to Westinghouse Electric Company's Columbia facility as part of a settlement agreement involving the actions of a former contractor foreman. That individual deliberately created inaccurate training records for his work group and also falsified ventilation system data when the required readings had not been taken. The foreman caused Westinghouse to be in violation of NRC requirements.
> View NRC release Aug. 7, 2009
NRC increases oversight of Westinghouse's fuel fabrication plant in Columbia
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission is increasing oversight of
Westinghouse's fuel fabrication plant in Columbia, South Carolina, after the
plant's latest performance assessment found problems with safety operations
and facility support, the agency said on Wednesday.
Normally the plant is evaluated once every two years. It will now be
evaluated every 18 months until the agency sees improvement, NRC spokesman
Roger Hannah said. The agency's last assessment, for the period February 13,
2007 to February 13, 2009, found two Severity Level III violations and six
Severity Level IV violations. (Platts Apr. 15, 2009)
> View NRC release Apr. 15, 2009
Westinghouse Electric Co plans construction of new dry conversion process at Columbia nuclear fuel plant (South Carolina)
By letter dated July 3, 2007, Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC (WEC) notified the NRC that it plans to install a new Dry Conversion Process at the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility (CFFF). WEC has an existing dry conversion process within the main manufacturing building at the CFFF that was operated from approximately 1985 to 1995. This facility was mothballed in place for business
reasons. Rather than restoring the current processing equipment, WEC plans to construct a new building within its Controlled Access Area to meet current industry codes and standards.
On Dec. 15, 2008, WEC notified the NRC it "plans to delay for business reasons implementation of a project to install a new Dry Conversion Facility at the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility (CFFF)."
Employee burned with hydrofluoric acid at Westinghouse Electric Co's Columbia nuclear fuel plant (South Carolina)
On February 26, 2007, an employee was burnt with hydrofluoric acid (HF) and sent to the hospital for treatment. The root cause of the event was determined to be that the uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinder valve failed to seat.
(WEC/NRC, Dec. 18, 2007)
Westinghouse Electric Co requests 20-year license renewal for Columbia nuclear fuel plant (South Carolina)
NRC issues notice of license renewal request of Westinghouse Electric
Company, Columbia, SC, and opportunity to request a hearing.
Federal Register: December 29, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 249) p. 77195-77197 (download full text )
On April 19, 2007, the NRC staff issued an Environmental Assessment concluding that the renewal of the license will not result in a significant impact to the environment.
NRC proposes $24,000 fine for violations of criticality safety procedures
> View NRC release Jul 30, 2004
> Download NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 70-1151/2004-001 (May 13, 2004) (PDF)
> Download IR 07001151-04-001, Corrected page 18 (June 1, 2004) (PDF)
> Download June 3, 2004, Predecisional Enforcement Conference presentation slides (PDF)
> Download Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, EA-04-096 (July 28, 2004) (PDF)
ATSDR assessment finds no radiation-based health threat from eating plants and animals found near the Savannah River Site, while mercury exposure might increase health risks
Eating plants and animals grown or produced near the U.S. Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS) does not expose people to harmful levels of radioactive contaminants, says the federal Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) in a recently released public health assessment. However, consuming large amounts of bowfin, largemouth bass, and catfish from certain portions of the Savannah River might increase health risks from mercury exposure, especially to children or other sensitive populations.
> View ATSDR release March 26, 2012
> Download Public Health Assessment for Evaluation of Exposures to Contaminants in
Biota Originating from the Savannah River Site (USDOE), Aiken, South Carolina, Feb. 29, 2012 (17.9M PDF - ATSDR)
Groups demand termination of plutonium disposition EIS process
On May 8, 2013, fifteen environmental groups sent a letter to DOE demanding the termination of the plutonium disposition EIS process: "Given that the plutonium disposition program is now under review and subject to change, the EIS as is now being pursued is no longer valid and must be halted."
> View/download: group letter to DOE, May 8, 2013
U.S. DOE issues Draft Supplemental EIS on Surplus Plutonium Disposition: fabrication into MOX fuel is preferred alternative
The comment period remains open through October 10, 2012.
> Download EIS-0283-S2: Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement - Surplus Plutonium Disposition , U.S. Department of Energy, July 2012
> See also: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (DOE NNSA)
Savannah River Site facility to be used to feed future MOX plant
The federal government is going to use a facility at the Savannah River site near Aiken to produce tons of plutonium oxide for the complex's future mixed-oxide fuel plant.
The National Nuclear Security Administration said Monday it has decided to use H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site to produce nearly 4 metric tons of plutonium oxide for the MOX plant.
The mixed-oxide, or MOX, plant is designed to dispose of plutonium from dismantled bombs by blending the plutonium with uranium to make commercial reactor fuel. Officials say the H-Canyon decision is saving 90 jobs.
The SRS complex once produced plutonium and tritium for atomic bombs. Construction on the MOX facility began in 2007. Officials say the facility is on schedule and should be running in 2016.
(Charlotte Observer Oct. 31, 2011)
Plan would send contaminated plutonium from Savannah River Site to New Mexico for disposal
About 500 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium now stored at Savannah River Site could leave South Carolina within four years, according to a proposal to send the tightly guarded material to a permanent disposal site in New Mexico.
The plutonium is among six metric tons that is contaminated or otherwise unsuitable for conversion to commercial nuclear reactor fuel in the government's mixed oxide "mox" plant under construction at the site.
"We already know that, no matter what we wanted to do, we cannot make it suitable for mox," said Jim Giusti, an Energy Department spokesman. "Instead of having it sit here, we know we can blend it with materials that remove the security requirements for it, and it can be disposed of as transuranic waste."
According to an environmental bulletin (400k PDF) issued Wednesday (Oct. 26), the plutonium would be moved to the government's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico during a series of 120 shipments over a three-year period. The site, near the city of Carlsbad, includes a repository 2,000 feet below the surface within layers of geologic salt.
Before being shipped, the plutonium would be blended with a classified material, known only as "stardust," that can convert highly contaminated plutonium into a less dangerous form that is also proliferation resistant.
"It would then become very difficult and very expensive for anyone to try to recover the plutonium," Giusti said. "It would also no longer be required to have the high security safeguards that are now required."
The bulk of the government's surplus plutonium - about 34 metric tons from about 17,000 dismantled warheads - is scheduled to be processed at a $4.8 billion mox plant, scheduled for startup in 2016.
The material would be blended with traditional uranium to make fuel suitable for use in commercial reactors.
(The Augusta Chronicle Oct. 26, 2011)
> Download Interim Action Determination, Disposition of Certain Plutonium Materials Stored at the Savannah River Site , Oct. 17, 2011 (880k PDF)
DOE issues amended Notice of Intent to modify the scope of the Surplus
Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement and
Conduct Additional Public Scoping
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announces its intent to
modify the scope of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement (SPD Supplemental EIS, DOE/EIS-0283-S2)
and to conduct additional public scoping. DOE issued its Notice of
Intent \1\ (NOI) to prepare the SPD Supplemental EIS on March 28, 2007
(72 FR 14543). DOE now intends to revise the scope of the SPD
Supplemental EIS to refine the quantity and types of surplus weapons-usable plutonium material, evaluate additional alternatives, and no
longer consider in detail one alternative identified in the NOI
(ceramic can-in-canister immobilization). Also, DOE had identified a
glass can-in-canister immobilization approach as its preferred
alternative in the NOI; DOE will continue to evaluate that alternative
but currently does not have a preferred alternative.
DOE now proposes to analyze a new alternative to install the
capability in K-Area at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to, among other
things, disassemble nuclear weapons pits (a weapons component) and
convert the plutonium metal to an oxide form for fabrication into mixed
uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) reactor fuel in the Mixed Oxide Fuel
Fabrication Facility (MFFF); under this alternative, DOE would not
build the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), which DOE
previously decided to construct. This K-Area project also would provide
capabilities needed to prepare plutonium for other disposition
alternatives evaluated in the SPD Supplemental EIS and to support the
ongoing plutonium storage mission in K-Area.
DOE also proposes to
evaluate a new alternative to dispose of some surplus non-pit plutonium
as transuranic waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New
Mexico, provided the plutonium would meet the criteria for such
disposal.
In addition, DOE will analyze the potential environmental
impacts of using MOX fuel in up to five reactors owned by the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) at the Sequoyah (near Soddy-Daisy, TN) and
Browns Ferry (near Decatur and Athens, AL) nuclear stations. TVA will
be a cooperating agency with DOE for preparation and review of the
sections of the SPD Supplemental EIS that address operation of TVA
reactors.
The public scoping period will end on September 17, 2010.
Federal Register: July 19, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 137) p. 41850-41853 (download full text )
DOE issues Notice of Intent To Prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement for Surplus Plutonium Disposition at the Savannah River Site
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) intends to prepare a
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) to evaluate the
potential environmental impacts of plutonium disposition capabilities
that would be constructed and operated at the Savannah River Site (SRS)
near Aiken, South Carolina. DOE completed the Surplus Plutonium
Disposition (SPD) EIS (DOE/EIS-0283) in November 1999, and on January
11, 2000, published a Record of Decision (ROD) in the Federal Register
(65 FR 1608). DOE decided to dispose of approximately 17 metric tons of
plutonium surplus to the nation's defense needs using an immobilization
process and up to 33 metric tons by using the surplus plutonium as
feedstock in the fabrication of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel to be irradiated
in commercial reactors. DOE selected the SRS as the site for all
surplus plutonium disposition facilities. Subsequently, DOE cancelled
the immobilization portion of its disposition strategy due to budgetary
constraints (ROD, 67 FR 19432, April 19, 2002). The selection of the
SRS as the location for disposition facilities for up to 50 metric tons
of surplus plutonium remains unchanged. Site preparation for the MOX
Fuel Fabrication Facility at the SRS began in November 2005.
The 2002 decision left DOE with about 13 metric tons of surplus
plutonium that does not have a defined path to disposition (about 4
metric tons of the 17 metric tons originally considered for
immobilization has been designated for programmatic use). DOE has been
investigating alternative disposition technologies and will now prepare
an SEIS for Surplus Plutonium Disposition at the SRS (DOE/EIS-0283-S2)
to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of those alternatives.
DOE's preferred alternative is to construct and operate a vitrification
facility within an existing building at the SRS. This facility would
immobilize plutonium within a lanthanide borosilicate glass inside
stainless steel cans. The cans then would be placed within larger
canisters to be filled with vitrified high-level radioactive waste in
the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at the SRS. The canisters
would be suitable for disposal in a geologic repository. DOE also would
prepare some of the surplus plutonium for disposal by processing it in
the H-Canyon at the SRS, then sending it to the high-level waste tanks
and DWPF. DOE seeks to take this action to reduce the threat of nuclear
weapons proliferation worldwide by disposing of surplus plutonium in
the United States in a safe and environmentally sound manner. The
preferred vitrification technology, along with processing in H-Canyon,
would fulfill this need for
disposition of surplus plutonium materials that are not planned for
disposition via fabrication into MOX fuel.
Federal Register: March 28, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 59) p. 14543-14546 (download full text )
ATSDR assessment finds no contamination in off-site groundwater from the Savannah River Site
The federal Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has found no contamination in off-site groundwater from the Savannah River Site (SRS). While site-related contaminants were detected in off-site surface water, they pose no health concern. In the course of its investigation, ATSDR also found naturally occurring radium in the municipal drinking water at levels that could pose health concerns, especially for infants drinking formula and juice mixed with tap water. In December 2006, authorities removed from service the well where radium was found.
> View ATSDR release Dec. 21, 2007
> Download Public Health Assessment (PDF)
> see also: Downblending of U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for commercial reactor use
HEU downblending starts at Savannah River Site
The first step in a government program to convert weapons-grade uranium into electricity has begun at Savannah River Site.
The process involves combining the excess uranium, which has been chemically enriched, with natural uranium to make low-enriched uranium fuel. The fuel will be used in Tennessee Valley Authority nuclear reactors.
In order to get the uranium into its new form and ready for shipment, SRS built or modified buildings for purifying, blending and loading the material.
(Augusta Chronicle May 22, 2003)
NRC License No. SNM-42, Docket No. 07000027
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NRC finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at B&W Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Download Inspection Report and Notice of Violations, Oct. 30, 2012 (160k PDF)
NRC finds further violations of criticality safety procedures at B&W Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Download Inspection Report and Notice of Violations, Aug. 15, 2012 (272k PDF)
NRC finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at B&W Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Download Inspection Report and Notice of Violation, July 15, 2011 (132k PDF)
NRC finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at B&W Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Download Inspection Report and Notice of Violation, Nov. 4, 2010 (278k PDF)
EPA invites commment on proposal to exclude sludge from wastewater treatment facility at B&W Lynchburg nuclear plant from hazardous waste regulation
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is proposing to grant a petition submitted by Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group, Inc., [...] to exclude (or delist) on a one-time basis from the lists of hazardous waste, a certain solid waste [sludge produced by its wastewater treatment facility] generated at its Mt. Athos facility near Lynchburg, Virginia.
The Agency is requesting comments on this proposed decision.
To make sure we consider your comments on this proposed exclusion, they must be received by November 22, 2010.
> Federal Register: October 7, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 194) p. 62040-62048 (download full text )
NRC issues Notice of Opportunity To Request a Hearing and Provide Written
Comments on Order Approving Indirect License Transfers of BWX Lynchburg (VA) and Erwin (TN) nuclear fuel facilities
A request for a hearing must be filed by July 1, 2010. Comments must be received by July 10, 2010..
Docket ID NRC-2010-0199
Federal Register: June 11, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 112) p. 33362-33365
(download full text )
Alert over potential criticality issue after discharge of highly enriched uranium at B&W Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed a $35,000 civil penalty against the Babcock & Wilcox facility in Lynchburg, Va., for a violation of NRC requirements related to the company's emergency declaration for an event in July 2009.
The violation involved a failure of Babcock & Wilcox facility staff to declare an Alert emergency classification in a timely manner as required by their emergency plan. On July 15, 2009, company employees failed to declare the emergency for more than two hours after they discovered a band saw cooling reservoir did not have the proper criticality controls.
> View NRC release Jan. 12, 2010
> Download Notice of Violation Jan. 11, 2010 (ADAMS Acc. No. ML100110209)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has scheduled a predecisional enforcement conference in Atlanta for Nov. 6, 2009, to discuss with officials of Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group in Lynchburg, Va., apparent violations of NRC requirements associated with the loss of nuclear criticality controls on a mechanical saw.
> View NRC release Oct. 29, 2009
A scare at the B&W Nuclear Operations Group in Lynchburg Wednesday (July 15) prompted a review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission after oil containing an unknown amount of highly enriched uranium discharged at the facility.
The incident began around 7:45 p.m. Wednesday (July 15). According to a news release from the NRC, a saw used to cut fuel components discharged some of that oil. The facility declared an alert and the NRC called in its response teams.
Staff at the facility analyzed the materials and determined only a small amount of uranium was in the oil.
(WDBJ7 Roanoke News July 16, 2009)
Violation of criticality criteria during planned upgrades at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On Dec. 10, 2008, BWXT Technologies Inc. issued an Event Notification to the NRC, reporting that planned upgrades to the Low Level Dissolver System had led to the use of dissolver trays with an inadequate geometry violating the criticality criteria.
NRC orders $32,500 fine for liquid hydrogen fluoride (HF) spill at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has ordered B&W Nuclear Operations Group in Lynchburg, Va., to pay a $32,500 civil penalty for B&W's failure to have adequate instructions for workers on how to neutralize acid spills.
> View NRC release June 17, 2010
On April 28, 2008, a process operator received an exposure of liquid hydrogen fluoride (HF) to the eye, while trying to neutralize a liquid HF spill.
> Download EA-08-204: Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty - $32,500 , NRC Region II, Oct. 20, 2008 (ADAMS Acc. No. ML082960026)
NRC releases old event reports for BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant (Virginia)
On May 12, 2008, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission released event notification reports for two nuclear fuel fabrication facilities, Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) in Erwin, Tenn., and BWX Technologies (BWXT) in Lynchburg, Va., for the period 2004 - 2007, which were previously withheld for security reasons.
> View NRC release No. 08-091, May 12, 2008
NRC finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
"...on October 22, 2007, the licensee failed to conduct operations
according to administrative limits (e.g., quantity of containers and moderating materials)
established by NCS and provided on an NCS posting. Specifically, a 2.5 liter container
and a zip lock bag were observed in the Cyclone Glovebox, located in the Specialty
Fuels Facility. The NCS posting on the Cyclone Glovebox limits the glovebox to a
maximum of one container with a volume less than or equal to 2.5 liters and also limits
the moderating materials permitted in the glovebox to only materials that are necessary
for normal operations."
(NRC Inspection Report No. 70-27/2007-205, Nov. 14, 2007)
NRC finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant; proposes $32,500 fine
The apparent violation involved the failure to analyze the nuclear criticality safety associated with the transfer of Raschig ring vacuum cleaners at the facility. This condition was identified on July 26, 2007, when a Raschig ring vacuum cleaner spilled its contents of special nuclear material-bearing solution, during transfer, into an attached plastic bag being used for contamination control. The failure to analyze the transfer activity resulted in special nuclear material-bearing solution being in a condition without any nuclear criticality safety controls. (NRC Inspection Report No. 70-27/2007-006, October 19, 2007)
On Jan. 24, 2008, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Thursday proposed a $32,500 fine against BWX Technologies for this violation of NRC safety requirements.
> View NRC release Jan. 24, 2008
NRC announces notice of license amendment, and opportunity to request a hearing for exemption to criticality accident requirements at BWX Technologies, Inc. Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received, by letter dated May 2, 2007, a license amendment application from BWX Technologies, Inc. (BWXT), requesting an exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24, Criticality Accident Requirements, in its materials license, at its Mt. Athos site located in Lynchburg, Virginia.
Federal Register: July 3, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 127) p. 36515-36516 (download full text )
On Nov. 30, 2007, NRC issued an Environmental assessment (EA) and finding of no significant impact (FONSI).
Federal Register: December 7, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 235) p. 69234-69236 (download full text )
Federal Register: December 13, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 239) p. 70899-70900 (download full text )
License renewal
Notice of Issuance of Renewed License, BWX Technologies, Inc., Lynchburg, VA
Federal Register: April 6, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 66), p. 17195 (download full text )
Notice of Availability of Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for License Renewal for BWX Technologies, Inc., Lynchburg, VA
Federal Register: March 31, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 62) p. 16348-16349 (download full text )
The NRC provides notice that this is a proceeding on an application for a license amendment regarding the license renewal for BWX Technologies, Inc.
Federal Register: March 6, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 43) p. 11231-11232 (download full text )
NRC again finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On Feb. 7, 2005, NRC issued a Notice of Violation to BWXT for violating the criticality safety procedures in the scrap material storage cabinet.
NRC again finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On March 31, 2004, NRC inspectors observed special nuclear material in a storage location not in conformance with the nuclear criticality safety posting requirement.
NRC finds further violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On March 2, 2004, NRC inspectors observed special nuclear material in a storage location not in conformance with the nuclear criticality safety posting control requirement.
NRC finds violation of criticality safety procedures at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
During an inspection held on Feb. 9-13, 2004, the U.S. NRC identified a violation of the prescribed criticality safety procedures: an item had been introduced into the Uranium Recovery facility without the required Nuclear Criticality Safety review and approval.
NRC issues Environmental Assessment and FONSI to approve the Final Status Survey Plan and Decommissioning Plan for Industrial Waste Landfill 1 at BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
Federal Register: November 14, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 220) p. 64665-64668
(download full text )
NRC cites BWXT for inoperable criticality monitors in Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> View NRC enforcement document: EA-03-119 - BWX Technologies, Inc. (Aug. 11, 2003)
> Download related NRC Information Notice: IN 2003-10 (Aug. 4, 2003) (PDF)
NRC relaxes air monitoring requirements for BWXT Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
> Federal Register: October 2, 2002 (Vol. 67, No. 191) p. 61929-61931 (download full text )
"Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact of License Amendment for BWX Technologies, Inc.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering the amendment
of Special Nuclear Material License SNM-42 to authorize elimination of
Lynchburg Technology Center (LTC) stack continuous monitoring and
revise other air monitoring stack action levels at the BWX
Technologies, Inc., facility located in Lynchburg, VA, and has prepared
an Environmental Assessment in support of this action."
The license amendment was issued on September 30, 2002.
Two uranium fuel plants in Lynchburg, Virginia, and Erwin, Tennessee, must immediately adopt stricter anti-terrorist measures such as more guards, vehicle barriers and patrols, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said on Aug. 22, 2002.
The plants, owned by BWX Technologies Inc. and Nuclear Fuel Services, take enriched uranium and make it into fuel for nuclear reactors.
The NRC said it ordered the two plants to adopt similar measures already put in place by U.S. nuclear power plants as a precaution after the Sept. 11 attacks. (Reuters Aug. 22, 2002)
> View NRC release Aug. 22, 2002
> Federal Register: August 27, 2002 (Vol. 67, No. 166) p. 55039-55040 (download full text )
> see also: Downblending of U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for commercial reactor use
NRC issues license amendment for HEU metal dissolution facility
Federal Register: January 16, 2002 (Vol. 67, No. 11), p. 2251-2254 (download full text ):
"Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact of
License Amendment for BWX Technologies, Inc., and Notice of Opportunity
To Request a Hearing
ACTION: Amendment of BWX Technologies, Inc., Materials License SNM-42
to authorize the installation and use of the Metal Dissolution
Facility."
The Metal Dissolution Facility (MDF) is required for the dissolution of high enriched uranium (HEU) metal to support BWXT's downblending operations.
The license amendment was issued on January 25, 2002.
License No. SNM-33, Docket No. 07000036
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> View more recent issues
The nuclear fuel plant in Hematite, Missouri, was closed in summer 2001. The plant was formerly owned by CE Nuclear Power LLC and is now owned by BNFL/Westinghouse.
On June 10, 2000, a plant operator at the CE Nuclear Power LLC's Fuel Fabrication Facility in Hematite, Missouri, identified that several "erbia" pellets were mixed in with a normal lot of uranium oxide pellets. Erbia pellets are used in fuel assemblies as neutron absorbers and the erbia manufacturing process line is separate from the uranium oxide process lines." [...]
"The licensee's investigation team has not yet completed its onsite activity; however, sufficient information has been obtained to conclude that the mixing of erbia pellets was a deliberate act."
NRC PNO June 16, 2000
"On May 22, 2000, Westinghouse-Hematite fuel fabrication facility in the
U.S. shipped a presumed empty pellet container (drum) to Westinghouse Atom
AB in Sweden. When the container was opened in Sweden for re-filling, it
was found to contain almost 40 kg of fresh fuel pellets. The pellets are
believed to have been produced originally in Sweden and then delivered to
Hematite, where they should have been removed. The container should then
have been returned to Sweden empty. A preliminary investigation at Hematite
indicates that the pellets were natural uranium with gadolinium, however
the paper trail is unclear. Because the drum was thought to be empty,
standard procedures for nuclear material shipments were not followed. The
Swedish nuclear authorities are also investigating the incident. They plan
to analyze the pellets and will report the results to us. The investigation
in the U.S. is continuing." (NRC Weekly Information Report For the Week Ending June 30, 2000)
"ABB's fuel fabrication plant at Hematite, Missouri, is to close, consolidating
most of Westinghouse's US fuel operations at its Columbia plant in South Carolina. Westinghouse is owned by BNFL, and ABB finalised the sale of its nuclear activities to BNFL last week." (UI News Briefing 00.20, May 17, 2000)
(formerly Framatome ANP, Framatome Cogema Fuels)
NRC License No. SNM-1168 (terminated), Docket No. 07001201
Virginia Radioactive Materials License No. 680-515-1
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> see decommissioning issues
NRC terminates licence for Areva's Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On Sep. 28, 2012, NRC terminated licence SNM-1168 for Areva's Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant. The final decontamination and decommissioning of the facility will be conducted under Areva's Radioactive Materials license with the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Areva to close Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
Areva announced Tuesday (Sep. 29) that it plans to move all nuclear fuel-making operations to its Richland plant.
The multinational company said it will end fuel production in Lynchburg, Va., and produce fuel assemblies only in Richland, where it has operated for decades. The transition will begin next spring.
(The News Tribune Sep. 30, 2009)
By letter dated August 25, 2010, Areva NP, Inc. provided notification to the NRC of its
intent to cease fuel manufacturing and the use of special nuclear material at the Mt. Athos Road Site in Lynchburg. This letter also requests postponement of the initiation of decommissioning of the facility.
On Oct. 29, 2010, NRC requested the submission of a decommissioning plan within 12 months. Areva's request to postpone the initiation of decommissioning was denied.
Framatome ANP applies for relaxed criticality safety requirements at Lynchburg nuclear fuel plant
On Feb. 27, 2004, Framatome ANP applied for a license amendment to increase the Keff limit, a parameter describing the criticality safety. Framatome requests an increase of the Keff limit for credible abnormal conditions from 0.95 to 0.98 and the Keff limit for normal conditions from 0.87 to 0.95.
On Oct. 4, 2004, Framatome ANP withdrew the license amendment application.
NRC issues EA and FONSI for License Renewal of Framatome ANP Lynchburg plant
Federal Register: May 7, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 88) p. 24521 (view full text )
NRC to issue Finding of No Significant Impact
No requests for a hearing were received. Based on an evaluation of the environmental impacts of the renewal request, the NRC has determined that the proper action is to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact. (NRC Memorandum April 2, 2003)
NRC issues Notice of Intent To Prepare an Environmental Assessment, and Notice of Opportunity for a Hearing
Federal Register: August 9, 2002 (Vol. 67, No. 154) p. 51894-51895
(view full notice )
(formerly Framatome ANP, Siemens Power Corp., Advanced Nuclear Fuels)
License No. SNM-1227, Docket No. 07001257
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NRC Facility Info (Decommissioning)
NRC approves new uranyl nitrate building at Areva Richland nuclear fuel plant
On May 30, 2013, NRC issued a license amendment approving the Uranyl Nitrate Building (UNB) at Areva's Richland nuclear fuel plant.
Loss of criticality safety controls at Areva Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant
During an NRC inspection conducted February 11-14, 2013, two Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements were identified: The violations involve changes associated with the construction and operation of the Uranyl Nitrate Building (UNB). The first Severity Level IV violation is the construction and operation of the UNB without obtaining a license amendment. The second Severity Level IV violation is the failure to perform and document an adequate evaluation of the changes.
These violations are not being cited, as the guidance provided by the NRC lacked sufficient clarity.
(Inspection Report no. 70-1257/2013-201 and exercise of enforcement discretion, March 20, 2013)
Areva Richland fuel facility's shipments of UO2 powder to Japan routinely violated criticality safety rules
On Nov. 12, 2012, Areva NP Inc., notified NRC that it discovered on September 13, 2012, that the majority of its past shipments of UO2 powder to a Japanese customer utilizing the TNF-XI packaging did not fully comply with the payload restrictions in U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) Competent Authority Certificate (CAC) USA/0653/AF-96. The violation concerns the material loading limits, which are based on the criticality safety analysis.
Small fire in ventilation system of AREVA's Richland nuclear fuel plant
A small fire broke out about 3 p.m. Friday (Sep. 7) in a ventilation system of the Areva plant in Richland, which manufactures fuel assemblies for nuclear power reactors.
No radioactive material is believed to have been involved, said Tom Huntington, a Richland Fire Department battalion chief.
There also were no contaminants released from the plant, according to Areva.
The fire was in the uranium oxide building, where uranium is manufactured into fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies, but was in a small back room used to cut metal, said Areva spokeswoman Anna Markham.
The ventilation system there is part of a system that is self-contained, with no air blowing outside, she said. Air samples taken in the room showed no abnormal conditions, she said.
Firefighters discovered a series of small fires in the ventilation system that were difficult to access, he said. Because they had to tear apart enough of the system to reach the fires, it took until 4:05 p.m. to extinguish them, Huntington said.
(Tri-City Herald Sep. 8, 2012)
On Apr. 11, 2012, Areva NP Inc. notified NRC that it had received a non-compliant 30B cylinder with enriched UF6 that had been sent by Urenco Gronau via Areva Pierrelatte. "The noncompliance was due to the UF6 cylinder having inadequate valve thread engagement per ANSI N14.1-2001." There is, however "no evidence that the valve connection leaked".
(ADAMS Acc. No. ML12104A276)
The cylinder apparently was part of a shipment of 21 cylinders announced in Advance Notification 21116-TNI-001-02 (ADAMS Acc. No. ML11125A126, ML11125A109).
Loss of criticality safety controls at Areva Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant
During an NRC inspection conducted between October 17 and 20, 2011, a Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements was identified: the licensee failed to verify prior to use in the process that HEPA Filter Cabinet Criticality Drain (C186DR14) was able to fulfill the requirements identified in the criticality safety analyses. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify that drain C186DR14, IROFS 6914, prevented retention of uranyl nitrate solution inside the HEPA filter cabinet beyond a favorable geometry (depth), by directing liquid overflow to the room floor.
(NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NO. 070-01257/2011-005, January 25, 2012)
Loss of criticality safety controls at Areva Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant
During a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection from February 7-11, 2011, a Severity Level IV violation was identified: the licensee failed to implement items relied on for safety for the ammonia recovery facility stripper column to prevent an inadvertent nuclear criticality, which is a credible high consequence event.
(INSPECTION REPORT NO. 70-1257/2011-201 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION, March 11, 2011)
NRC identifies willful falsification of documents at Areva NP's Richland nuclear fuel plant
An investigation initiated on April 3, 2009, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office of Investigations, Region II, determined that a former Advisory Engineer, AREVA NP Inc. willfully falsified transit approval forms regarding overseas shipments of low enriched uranium and also that the same Advisory Engineer failed to follow procedural requirements for release of criticality calculations that pertained to uranium shipments.
(NRC EA-10-041, Aug. 10, 2010)
On Dec. 3, 2010, NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to the Areva Richland facility.
> Download NRC release Dec. 3, 2010 (PDF)
> Download Confirmatory Order EA-10-041 , Nov. 29, 2010 (ADAMS Acc. No. ML103280261)
> Federal Register: December 13, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 238) p. 77675-77677 (download full text )
NRC issues Confirmatory Order to Areva NP's nuclear fuel processing facility in Richland, Wash.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a Confirmatory Order to Areva NP's nuclear fuel processing facility in Richland, Wash., which has agreed to a series of corrective actions related to materials safety.
The settlement was achieved under the NRC's Alternative Dispute Resolution process, which was initiated at the request of Areva NP to address a willful violation of a facility safety procedure. On Jan. 6, the NRC notified Areva that an agency investigation determined that a plant employee had willfully defeated the function of a tool relied upon for safety.
> View NRC release Apr. 27, 2010
> Download Confirmatory Order EA-09-272, Apr. 26, 2010 (PDF)
Loss of criticality safety controls at Areva Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant
During a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection from September 18 through 23, 2009, a Severity Level IV violation was identified regarding the presence of prohibited unfavorable geometry containers (open and unattended plastic bags larger than 5.5 gallons) in Room 102A.
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 70-1257/2009-202 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION, October 21, 2009)
Areva to move Lynchburg nuclear fuel production to Richland
Areva announced Tuesday (Sep. 29) that it plans to move all nuclear fuel-making operations to its Richland plant, which will add 50 jobs to the facility and allay fears generated last year that the company might leave the Tri-Cities.
The multinational company said it will end fuel production in Lynchburg, Va., and produce fuel assemblies only in Richland, where it has operated for decades. The transition will begin next spring.
(The News Tribune Sep. 30, 2009)
NRC denies Areva NP's request to withhold Advanced Notifications of Export Shipments from public disclosure
On Aug. 19, 2009, NRC denied a request by Areva NP to withhold Areva's Advanced Notifications of Export Shipments from public disclosure. NRC will rather continue to make these notifications available to the public, 30 days after the material has
been delivered.
(ADAMS Acc. no. ML091550364 )
Security guard falsified access authorization forms at AREVA NP Inc. Richland nuclear fuel plant
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory has issued a Confirmatory Order to AREVA NP Inc.'s Richland facility as part of a settlement agreement involving a security guard who falsified access authorization forms. The guard's actions caused AREVA to be in violation of its security procedures, and allowed unauthorized individuals unescorted access to the Richland, Wash., nuclear materials facility.
> View NRC release July 24, 2009
Areva obtains approval for installation of supercritical CO2 uranium recovery process at Richland nuclear fuel plant
By letter dated June 12, 2008, AREVA NP, Inc., applied for a license amendment of its Richland Facility for the installation of a supercritical CO2 uranium recovery process. The process will be utilized to recover uranium from solid uranium-containing residues, most notably incinerator ash.
Notice of Opportunity To Request a Hearing for License Amendment
Request From AREVA NP, Inc., Richland, WA and Order Imposing Procedures
for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information and
Safeguards Information for Contention Preparation.
A request for a hearing must be filed by March 17, 2009.
Federal Register: January 16, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 11) p. 3110-3114 (download full text )
On July 28, 2010, NRC amended the license, effective immediately.
> Download Safety Evaluation Report , July 2010
> Federal Register: September 24, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 185) p. 58446-58447 (download full text )
License renewal for AREVA NP Inc. Richland nuclear fuel plant
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received, by
letter dated October 24, 2006, a license renewal application from AREVA
NP, Inc. (AREVA), requesting renewal of License No. SNM-1227 at its
Richland fuel fabrication facility located in Richland, Washington.
AREVA requested renewal of their license for a period of 40 years [!].
Any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who desires to participate as a party must file a
written request for a hearing and a specification of the contentions
which the person seeks to have litigated in the hearing. A request for a hearing must be filed by May 14, 2007.
Federal Register: March 15, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 50) p. 12202-12204
(download full text )
On March 27, 2009, NRC issued a Notice of Availability of Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for License Amendment for AREVA NP, Inc., Richland, Washington.
Federal Register: April 3, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 63) p. 15312-15313 (download full text )
> Download Environmental Assessment Feb. 2009 (2.4MB PDF) (ADAMS Acc. No. ML090700258)
On April 24, 2009, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) announced that it has renewed the operating license of Areva NP's nuclear fuel fabrication facility in Richland, Wash., for an additional 40 years of operation. This is the first 40-year renewal of a nuclear facility license in the United States.
> View NRC release April 24, 2009
Federal Register: May 26, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 99) p. 24886
(download full text )
Workers Exposed To Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) Release
On Oct. 23, 2006, two workers were exposed to HF leaking from a cracked weld of conversion process line 3. One of the two workers was subsequently hospitalized for exposure to HF vapor. On October 26, 2006, evidence of a second crack was found in the weld near the original crack in the line 3 equipment. The licensee shut down line 3 conversion operations.
> Download NRC PNO-II-06-004, Oct. 26, 2006 (ADAMS Acc. No. ML063050036)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff is scheduled to meet with representatives of AREVA NP, Inc. on Thursday, April 12, 2007, to discuss apparent violations of agency requirements involving a small hydrogen fluoride release at the company's Richland, Wash., facility in late October 2006.
> View NRC release April 6, 2007
Uranium container falls off truck at Richland
A cargo container filled with about 4.5 short tons of uranium oxide powder fell off a truck leaving Richland's Framatome ANP nuclear fuel plant on Sep. 26, 2005, but company and state officials said there was no sign the toxic material inside had escaped. The accident happened about 3 p.m. when the cargo container fell from a flatbed truck as it pulled out of the plant's gate, said Chris Powers, a project manager for Framatome, which also is known as Areva.
(Tri City Herald Sep 27, 2005)
See also: NRC Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual Occurrence PNO-II-2005-007, September 27, 2005
On October 16, 2003, the U.S. NRC issued import license IW009, authorizing Framatome ANP Inc. to import 1200 kilograms uranium contained in Class A Radioactive Waste consisting of combustible materials (paper, wood, clothing, plastic) contaminated with low enriched uranium (LEU) oxide powder, enriched to 5% w/o maximum, generated during the LEU fuel fabrication process (conversion of UF6; production of UO2 powder; pressing UO2 powder into pellets; and loading pellets into fuel assemblies).
The waste originates from Advanced Nuclear Fuels GmbH (ANF), Lingen, Germany.
Framatome ANP Inc. will incinerate contaminated combustible materials to recover uranium. Slightly contaminated non-combustibles from processing will be returned to ANF in Germany, in accordance with NRC export license XW005 (issued Oct. 17, 2003). Arrangements for disposal of low-level radioactive waste at the US Ecology, Inc facility in Richland, Washington are in place.
On March 20, 2009, Areva NP applied for an extension of the expiration date of IW009/01 and filed a new export license application XW015 for the return of the
non-combustibles to ANF.
Small fire in the feed hopper of the solid waste uranium recovery incinerator at Framatome ANP Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant
"On February 20, 2003, at approximately 0630 hrs., a small fire occurred in the feed hopper of the solid waste uranium recovery incinerator involving a cardboard waste box, containing about 9.75 grams of U-235, which caught fire before it was fully fed into a waste incinerator. [...] There was no release of radioactive material from the facility as demonstrated by stack air sample results and samples taken from the roof and surroundings. The two employees in the facility were checked and no detectable contamination identified. [...]"
(NRC Preliminary Notification PNO-IV-03-014, Feb. 21, 2003)
"On April 3, 2002, the licensee reported the loss of a criticality control (neutron absorbing poison) on a
45 gallon [170 litre] drum of UO2 powder in the UO2 processing building on April 2, 2002. [...] The filled drum contained 250 kg of powder from floor sweepings and dried grinder sludge that was to be reprocessed. [...] According to the licensee, a criticality in the affected drum could theoretically be possible only had the moisture content been over ten times the process limit, or over fifty times the actual moisture content of
the affected drum. [...]"
(NRC preliminary notification of event or unusual occurrence -- PNO-IV-02-019,
April 4, 2002)
"On April 18, 2002, the onsite portion of a reactive inspection was completed at Framatome, ANP
Richland [...] The inspection confirmed that corrective actions taken
by the licensee were adequate to continue the dry powder loading operations. However, the
NRC engaged the licensee at the preliminary exit briefing and by telephone conference call on
April 23, 2002, to request additional followup actions to address potential broader concerns
related to procedures and management controls at the facility.[...]"
(NRC Weekly Information Report for the Week Ending April 26, 2002 - emphasis added)
On August 30, 2002, NRC imposed a $15,000 civil penalty on Framatome ANP.
> View NRC EA-02-099, Aug. 28, 2002
In consequence of the merger of the nuclear businesses of Siemens and Framatome into Framatome ANP (Framatome 66%, Siemens 34%), Siemens Power Corp becomes Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. (Framatome/Siemens news release 31 Jan 2001 PDF)
On November 9, 2000, Siemens Power Corp. reported the loss of criticality mass limit controls identified during an accountability audit of waste material transfers in the waste handling and packaging area the previous day.
(NRC Preliminary Notification PNO-IV-00-031, Nov 9, 2000 )
On October 12, 2000, Siemens Power Corp. reported the loss of criticality mass limit controls identified during operations in the Modular Extraction/Recovery Facility (MERF) the previous day.
(NRC Preliminary Notification PNO-IV-00-027, October 13, 2000 )
On June 29, 2000, a range fire approached the Siemens Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant to 800 meters. Plant production circuits were shutdown and non-essential personnel was evacuated. (NRC Preliminary Notification PNO-IV-00-016, June 29, 2000 )
By letter dated April 26, 2000, Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) is requesting a license amendment to increase the allowed transuranic activity (from Plutonium and Neptunium) for the UF6 feedstock processed at its Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant. SPC requests a 15-fold increase from 3.3 to 50 Bq/g U.
The transuranics are introduced into the feedstock through uranium reprocessed from spent nuclear fuel. For Np-237, 50 Bq correspond to 1.9 µg, for Pu-239, 50 Bq correspond to 0.022 µg.
For enrichments above 2.18 weight-%, the 1 µg Pu per g U-235 criterion of 10 CFR 50.2 would be met; and for 3% enriched uranium, the dose from inhalation of the material would increase by 0.65% compared to pure uranium, according to SPC.
> Retrieve 10 CFR 50.2: via NRC (Note: "106 grams" should read "10-6 grams") · via GPO (look for Production facility)
> SPC letter and attachments available through ADAMS (Docket No. 07001257)
> See also Properties of UF6
Siemens withdraws license application for use of waste solutions as fertilizer
In a letter to NRC, dated Nov. 30, 2000, Siemens Power Corp. (SPC) withdraws its application, dated May 19, 1999, for a license amendment to allow release of ammonium hydroxide / ammonium nitrate (AH/AN) solution for use as fertilizer. SPC has committed to the State of Washington to pursue non-agricultural uses for this material.
WA Department of Agriculture Registers Siemens Fertilizer
A liquid fertilizer produced by Siemens Power Corp. (SPC) at its commercial nuclear fuel plant in Richland was registered on June 23, 2000, by the Washington State Department of Agriculture; the stop-sale, ordered on February 11, 2000, is rescinded.
"According to the Department of Health (DOH), use of Siemens' ammonium hydroxide product as a fertilizer will have no adverse impacts on public health or the environment when used as directed. DOH found the level of uranium measured in a test sample was 250 times lower than the maximum level of 0.05 parts per million allowed in Siemens' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission license. In analyzing the product for radiological constituents, results showed the solution contains significantly less uranium than found naturally in soil and is exempt from the DOH's radioactive materials licensing requirements."
(WSDA News Release, June 23, 2000)
WA Department of Agriculture Issues Stop-sale Order for Uranium-containing Fertilizer Product
On Feb. 11, 2000, the Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) issued a statewide stop-sale order to Siemens Power Corporation of Richland regarding the unauthorized distribution of an unregistered, hazardous waste-derived fertilizer.
The product is an ammonium hydroxide solution that is a waste material from the production of nuclear reactor fuel.
WSDA is taking this action after discovering that Siemens Power
Corporation has been distributing the waste product for use as a
fertilizer since 1996. The stop sale and distribution order is issued
under WSDA's authority to prohibit distribution of unregistered
fertilizers in the state.
> View WSDA News Release (Feb. 11, 2000)
Siemens' Richland, WA, nuclear fuel plant plans to sell waste solutions as fertilizer
"Washington State Comments on Draft Environmental Assessment on Release of Solutions at Siemens Nuclear Fuel Facility
On January 4, 2000, the Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards (FCSS)
received a letter dated December 27, 1999, from the Washington State
Departments of Health and Ecology commenting on the draft Environmental
Assessment associated with a proposal by Siemens to sell solutions
containing trace amounts of uranium as fertilizer. The state raises a
number of concerns about the proposal, including state jurisdiction over
such releases. FCSS plans to discuss the concerns with the licensee and the
state. Once the comments have been adequately addressed, a final decision
will be made relative to the acceptability of the Siemens' proposal."
(U.S. NRC Weekly Information Report for the week ending Jan. 14, 2000)
The solutions have concentrations of uranium enriched to 5% of up to 0.05 mg/l.
> Background documents available at ADAMS (Docket No. 07001257)
(formerly Duke, Cogema, Stone & Webster)
> See extra page