Uranium Enrichment and Fuel Fabrication - Current Issues (France)
(last updated 16 May 2012)
> See also Current Issues for
> See also:
Information about French nuclear fuel cycle plants 
(Nuclear Safety Authority - ASN, in French)
Comment invited on guidance for the control of activities in the vicinity of nuclear installations
The Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) and the ministries of the environment of the interior are inviting public comment on a draft guidance to control activities in the vicinity of nuclear installations that are licensed as installation nucléaire de base (INB).
Comments have to be submitted by December 17, 2011.
> View ASN release Oct. 17, 2011 and download guidance (in French)
ASN releases supplemental safety reports on French nuclear fuel facilities prepared in wake of Fukushima disaster; Areva impedes download of its reports
On Sep. 16, 2011, nuclear regulator Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (ASN) released several reports on the safety at nuclear fuel plants. In the wake of the Fukushima disaster, ASN had requested these reports from the plant owners.
The reports prepared by Areva are only viewable as page images, impeding the download of the documents.
> Access Évaluations complémentaires de sûreté (ASN - in French)
A report prepared by the Haut Comité pour la Transparence et l'Information sur la Sécurité Nucléaire sheds some light on the materials produced at every stage of the production of the nuclear fuel eventually used in the nuclear power plants operated by EdF in France. It also analyses the international transfers connected to the reprocessing of uranium. The report had been commissioned by Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo and the Office parlementaire de l'évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques.
Avis sur la transparence de la gestion des matières et des déchets nucléaires produits aux différents stades du cycle du combustible ,
Haut Comité pour la Transparence et l'Information sur la Sécurité Nucléaire, 12 juillet 2010 (HCTISN - in French)
The study found an increased incidence of pancreas cancer with women "that cannot be explained based on current scientific knowledge".
> Download Étude sanitaire sur les cancers autour du site nucléaire du Tricastin ORS Rhône-Alpes – Juin 2010 (1.3M PDF, ORS - in French) · alternate source
Comments can be submitted until May 25, 2010.
> View La refonte de la réglementation générale des INB (ASN - in French)
> View Refonte de la réglementation technique des installations nucléaires de base (Ministry of Ecology - in French)
On Nov. 6, 2007, the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) announced the publication of the décret "procédures INB" in the Official Journal of Nov. 3, 2007.
> View ASN release Nov. 6, 2007 (in French)
> View Décret n° 2007-1557 du 2 novembre 2007 relatif aux installations nucléaires de base et au contrôle, en matière de sûreté nucléaire, du transport de substances radioactives , J.O n° 255 du 3 novembre 2007 page 18026 (in French)
The uranium recovered from reprocessing of spent fuel in France is not expected to be used for the manufacture of nuclear fuel in the near future. French utility EdF rather has made provisions for long-term storage of the reprocessed uranium for 250 years. This was revealed in a report of the French Court of Auditors on the decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the management of radioactive wastes.
Usage of the reprocessed uranium (REPU) is problematic for several reasons: since the REPU is contaminated with the artificial uranium isotopes U-232 and U-236, special precautions are necessary during processing: the U-232 and its decay products cause elevated radiation doses for the plant personnel, and the U-236 as a neutron absorber requires higher enrichment levels to achieve the same reactivity. In consequence, use of the REPU is not very attractive at present market conditions: conversion is three times more expensive than conversion of natural uranium, and enrichment cannot be done in France's sole enrichment plant (Eurodif gazeous diffusion plant), since the REPU would contaminate the plant's circuits. For production of two test refueling batches for the Cruas nuclear power plant, the REPU was enriched in a foreign (presumably Russian) centrifuge enrichment plant.
Of the 1050 t of spent uranium oxide fuel annually generated in France, 850 t are being reprocessed at La Hague, at present. (In addition, 100 t of spent MOX fuel arise, which are not reprocessed at all.) From reprocessing of uranium oxide fuel, approx. 816 t of uranium and 8.5 t of plutonium are recovered. Of the uranium recovered, approx. 650 t are converted to the more stable oxide form for long-term storage, awaiting future uses.
The uranium recovered in the former Marcoule reprocessing plant has never been recycled into nuclear fuel at all. It still stays at Marcoule, in the liquid form of uranyl nitrate, 3800 t owned by EdF, and 4800 t owned by CEA and Cogéma.
Cour des Comptes:
Le démantèlement des installations
nucléaires et la gestion des déchets
radioactifs, Rapport au Président de la République
suivi des réponses des administrations
et des organismes intéressés, Janvier 2005
> Download full report (in French)
(programme Silva – Séparation Isotopique par Laser de la Vapeur Atomique)
CEA terminates laser-based uranium enrichment research
France's Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique (CEA) has completed its research on laser-based uranium enrichment (SILVA programme). The research had been performed from the mid-1980's, co-financed by COGEMA from 1993 to 2002. From 2000 to 2003, an Euro 146 million feasibility study has been performed at Pierrelatte. During this study, some 200 kilograms of enriched uranium (and about one tonne of depleted uranium) have been produced in November 2003.
After COGEMA has made a decision to replace its Eurodif gaseous diffusion plant by centrifuge technology, the SILVA programme will be discontinued.
(CEA January 9, 2004)
INB No. 32, 54
Information about Cadarache plant (Nuclear Safety Authority - ASN, in French)
Commission Locale d'Information de Cadarache
Violation of criticality rules at Cadarache MOX fuel fabrication plant
On April 15, 2011, the Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA) announced that 24 bins at the Atelier de technologie plutonium (ATPu) and Laboratoire de purification chimique (LPC) workshops were found to exceeded the 100 g standard for fissile materials. The event was rated level 1 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).
(ASN May 24, 2011)
Violation of criticality rules at Cadarache MOX fuel fabrication plant
On Dec. 21, 2010, elevated amounts of fissile material were detected in four waste bins in the "l'Atelier de Technologie du Plutonium" (ATPu). The amounts were above the licensed limit, but far below the criticality level.
(Areva Dec. 30, 2010)
Violation of criticality rules at Cadarache MOX fuel fabrication plant
On Oct. 26, 2010, 246 g of fissile material were found in a waste drum that was licensed to hold only 100 g. Two other drums were identified, where this limit possibly was exceeded. The event had no impacts on workers nor environment. The event was rated level 1 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).
(ASN Nov. 9, 2010)
Surplus enriched uranium found at Cadarache MOX fuel fabrication plant
After the find of undeclared plutonium at Cadarache (see below), there now has been found excess enriched uranium, as well: 10 kg of low enriched uranium were found at a storage where only 4 kg were permitted.
(AFP Oct. 25, 2009)
ASN suspends dismantling work at Cadarache MOX fuel fabrication plant for undeclared criticality hazard
The French nuclear safety watchdog ASN has suspended work dismantling a plutonium technology plant over worker safety fears, after almost three times as much plutonium was found at the site than expected.
The watchdog said it was only told of the problem on Oct. 6, although the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), the state body that supervises the plant in Cadarache near the southern port of Marseille, had been aware of the problem since early June.
Around eight kilograms of plutonium were believed to have been stored at the site when it was in operation, but some 22 kilograms had been discovered to date and the final figure could be closer to 39 kilograms, the nuclear safety watchdog ASN said.
The underestimation of the quantity of plutonium sharply reduced safety margins designed to prevent fissile material reaching critical mass, "which could potentially have serious consequences for the workforce," the ASN statement said.
The watchdog ranked the event as a level two "incident" on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), which runs from zero to a maximum of seven for a major incident.
(Reuters Oct. 15, 2009)
> Download Avis de l’IRSN sur l’événement significatif déclaré le 6 octobre 2009 concernant l’Atelier de technologie du plutonium du centre de Cadarache (ATPu-INB 32) (Oct. 14, 2009) (96k PDF - in French)
On Nov. 3, 2009, ASN authorized the resumption of the dismantling work.
(ASN Nov. 3, 2009)
CRIIRAD presents study on environmental impact of Cadarache nuclear site
On June 23, 2009, the independent radiation laboratory CRIIRAD presented a study on the environmental impact of the nuclear center of Cadarache. Among others, the site comprises 19 Installations Nucléaire de Base (INB), including the closed MOX fuel plant. CRIIRAD had access to all site-specific documentation, but was not allowed to take independent measurements on site.
> View CRIIRAD documents June 23, 2009 (in French)
ASN orders CEA to clear former Cadarache MOX fuel plant of all nuclear material by end June 2008
> Download: Décision n° 2007-DC-0036 de l’Autorité de sûreté nucléaire du 21 mars 2007 (PDF - in French)
ASN upgrades Cadarache MOX fuel plant incident to level 2 on INES scale
The French Nuclear Safety Authority (Autorité de sûreté nucléaire - ASN) has upgraded an incident that occured on November 6, 2006, at Areva's Cadarache MOX fuel plant (Atelier de Technologie du Plutonium - ATPu) to level 2 on the INES scale. A mill used for grinding of MOX fuel rejects (consisting of oxides of depleted uranium and plutonium) had inadvertently been loaded twice, exceeding the criticality criterion for the mill, but fortunately no criticality event was set off.
(ASN Jan. 9, 2007)
Fabrication of MOX fuel lead test assemblies for the U.S. DOE plutonium disposition program
On Aug. 12, 2003, Cogema has won the contract to fabricate the mixed-oxide (MOX) lead test assemblies (LTAs) for the US plutonium disposition programme. (WNA News Briefing 03.35, Sep. 3, 2003)
> See also: WISE Paris release Sep. 9, 2003 : "Transfer" of MOX production capacity from Cadarache to Marcoule: one scandal after another
On Oct. 6, 2003, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) applied for an export license (XSNM03327) to export up to 140 kg of plutonium oxide to France for the production of four MOX fuel "lead assemblies". The material will be shipped in July/August 2004 by sea transport from Charleston Naval Weapons Station , South Carolina, to Cherbourg, France. For sea transport, two armed Pacific Nuclear Transport, Ltd. (PNTL) ships sailing in convoy will be used. The fabricated MOX fuel assemblies will be returned the same way.
> See also: Federal Register: October 27, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 207)p. 61238 (download full text )
On June 15, 2004, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission denied petitions to intervene filed by Greenpeace International, Charleston Peace, and Blue
Ridge Environmental Defense League and directed the Office of International Programs to issue the export license. (SRM-M040615)
On June 16, 2004, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued the requested license for the plutonium export to France (XSNM03327).
On November 7, 2003, the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) amended its January 11, 2000 Record of Decision (ROD) to allow for the fabrication of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel lead assemblies in France on a one-time basis.
> See: Federal Register: November 14, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 220) p. 64611-64614 (download full text )
On September 20, 2004, the Pacific Teal and the Pacific Pintail, two UK-registered ships dedicated to the transport of nuclear materials, left Charleston (South Carolina) carrying the plutonium for the MOX fuel lead assemblies to France. (Cogema Sep. 21, 2004)
Cadarache MOX fuel factory closed; concerns about possible future use for U.S. plutonium disposition program
The Cadarache MOX fuel factory ceased commercial production on July 31, 2003, due to the high seismic hazard at the site. The capacity of the MELOX plant at Marcoule will be increased to compensate for the closure.
> View ASN release Sep. 3, 2003 (in French)
However, according to a WISE-Paris Briefing, there is a possibility that the plant could be used for future production of MOX Lead Test Assemblies for the U.S. plutonium disposition program.
> View WISE-Paris release (July 30, 2003)
> Download WISE-Paris Briefing: U.S. "MOX Lead Test Assembly" Controversy: Fabrication at Cadarache, France (July 29, 2003) (325k PDF)
Cadarache factory will close in late 2002 or early 2003
The Cadarache mox fuel factory, which has been instructed to cease its activity because it does not comply with seismic safety regulations, is expected to close at the end of 2002 or early in 2003, according to the French nuclear safety agency ASN. In case owner Areva does not take the initiative in closing the site down, ASN will carry out the closure with the issue of a decree.
(La Tribune- France, Mar 21, 2002)
Cadarache Special of Plutonium Investigation newsletter
The April-May 2001 issue of WISE-Paris' newsletter Plutonium Investigation is a Cadarache Special:
> View/download Plutonium Investigation No.20
COGEMA confirms plans for closure of Cadarache MOX fuel plant
March 27, 2001: Cogéma confirms that it will close its Cadarache MOX fuel plant in a few years for the earthquake hazard at the plant site. The production of 40 t of MOX fuel is to be relocated to Cogéma's Marcoule plant. The closure might become effective in 2003. (AP March 27, 2001)
DSIN inspectors demand shutdown of Cadarache MOX fuel plant for earthquake hazard
July 19, 2000: After five years of fruitless pressure Cogema's L'Atelier de technologie du plutonium (ATPu) plant at Cadarache, which produces 40 tonnes of mixed oxide fuel (MOX) per year for export to Germany, government inspectors took the unprecedented step of releasing documents to WISE-Paris .
A 1994 survey showed that the area round Cadarache, near the mouth of the river Rhône, had experienced a "significant growth" of seismic activity since the end of 1993, and that "destructive" earthquakes could be expected to recur once a century.
The Directorate for the Safety of Nuclear Installations (Direction de la sûreté des installations nucléaires - DSIN ) held a meeting with the plant's operators Cogema in 1995, in which it said that "a rapid closure of the installation is necessary." It asked for a "plan for the future of the factory including a definitive closure date not long after 2000". (AFP, The Guardian, WISE-Paris)
> Download WISE-Paris briefing on Cadarache as PDF file (84k PDF in French)
> Download Briefing annexes (letters, map, figures) (848k PDF in French)
Cadarache events (ASN, in French)
INB No. 151
Information about Marcoule plant (Nuclear Safety Authority - ASN, in French)
Areva suspends capacity increase at MELOX MOX fuel plant
On Dec. 13, 2011, Areva announced the suspension of the capacity increase at the MELOX plant in Marcoule.
(AFP Dec. 13, 2011)
Contamination incident at MELOX MOX fuel plant
On June 28, 2011, a mechanical failure of an assembly bench caused a radioactive contamination event at the fuel assembly stage of the MELOX MOX fuel plant. Seventeen workers could return to their workplaces after medical checks. The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN July 5, 2011)
MELOX SA new owner of MELOX MOX fuel plant
On Sep. 3, 2010, the Ministry of Ecology approved the ownership change of the MELOX Marcoule plant from Areva NC to MELOX SA, a 100% owned subsidiary of Areva NC.
(Journal Officiel Sep. 5, 2010)
Worker contaminated in glove box accident at MELOX fuel fabrication plant
On Feb. 9, 2010, a worker was contaminated when the glove box he was using was damaged in an accident. The worker was transfered to a specialized medical service in the Paris area. The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Feb. 11, 2010)
MOX fuel lots mixed up at MELOX fuel fabrication plant
On Oct. 20, 2009, three baskets carrying MOX fuel pellets were mixed up at the Marcoule MOX plant. The error was not detected until Oct. 29, 2009. ASN rated the incident level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Nov. 6, 2009)
Violation of criticality rules at MELOX MOX fuel plant
On March 3, 2009, the amount of fissile material located in a working station exceeded the permissible limit by 1%. No criticality occured, as the limit is set at half the amount required to initiate a criticality. Areva had initially rated the event level 1 on the INES scale. In view of the violation of several safety requirements that led to the event, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) changed the rating to level 2 on the INES scale.
(Areva March 4, 2009; ASN March 19, 2009)
Spill at Marcoule waste water treatment plant
On July 17, 2007, three cubic meters of waste water with a specific activity of approx. 40 Bq/cm3 spilled inside the building; only some dozen litres reached the outside of the building. The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
Violation of criticality rules at MELOX MOX fuel plant
On May 29, 2007, an automatic transport cart carrying plutonium oxide was permitted to enter an already loaded working station. No criticality occured. The incident was rated INES 1.
(ASN July 9, 2007)
Government authorizes further capacity increase for MELOX MOX fuel plant
On April 26, 2007, Areva received government approval for the requested capacity increase of the MELOX MOX fuel plant from 145 to 195 tHM/a. (Areva April 27, 2007)
Public Inquiry into further extension of MELOX MOX fuel plant
On Feb. 2, 2006, the Vice Minister of Industry announced the start of the public consultation process regarding the increase of capacity from 145 to 195 tHM/a. The public inquiry will be held from April 18 to June 17, 2006.
> View speech of François Loos, Vice Minister of Industry, Feb. 2, 2006 (in French)
MELOX MOX fuel fabrication plant requests further capacity increase
In September 2004, MELOX requested a further capacity increase from 145 to 195 tHM/a. (Areva)
ASN authorizes capacity increase for MELOX MOX fuel plant
On Sep. 3, 2003, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) issued a decree authorizing a capacity increase from 101 to 145 tonnes for the MELOX MOX fuel plant at Marcoule. The increase compensates for the shutdown of the Cadarache MOX fuel plant. According to a COGEMA release of Sep. 4, 2003, the capacity increase is achieved without extension nor major modifications to the plant.
> View ASN release Sep. 4, 2003 (in French)
> View Décret n° 2003-843 (Journal Officiel Sep. 4, 2003) (in French)
Elevated radiation found near MELOX MOX fuel plant
The independent radiation monitoring organization CRIIRAD has found elevated gamma radiation on public roads and in vineyards outside the fence of the MELOX MOX fuel plant at Marcoule (Gard). The radiation exposure is twice background in some places. The radiation source is assumed to be waste stocked on site.
> Download CRIIRAD release Jan. 16, 2003 (179k PDF, in French)
On Jan. 14, 2003, Greenpeace France started a campaign of environmental monitoring around the Marcoule plant.
> View Greenpeace press release · campaign announcement (in French)
A public inquiry into the planned extension of the capacity of the MELOX mixed oxide (MOX) fuel plant in Marcoule will be initiated. The capacity increase is required to transfer the capacity of the Cadarache plant to Marcoule. The Cadarache plant is to be closed for its earthquake hazard.
> View ASN release Sep. 26, 2002 (in French)
The Ministries of the ecology and of the industry asked the prefect of Gard to open a public inquiry into the demand presented by COGEMA for the extension of the capacity of its MELOX factory of MOX fuel, located in Marcoule.
> View Ecol. Ministry release Oct. 23, 2002 (in French)
The public inquiry was set to begin on 8 January, 2003, in the two departements (counties) nearest the plant site at Marcoule. The prefect of the Gard departement that contains the Marcoule site announced the opening of the two-month inquiry on 3 December, 2002. (WNA News Briefing Jan. 15, 2003)
Marcoule events (ASN, in French)
INB No. 65, 90
Information about SICN plant (Nuclear Safety Authority - ASN, in French)
The plant halted all production at the end of 2002.
> View more recent issues
COGEMA/SICN nuclear fuel plant license jeopardized by poor safety culture
"From site surveillance visits of inspectors of the Nuclear Safety Authority, the generally low level in the matter of safety culture is known. The licensee has been informed that, if this situation became permanent, it would jeopardize the handling of any nuclear material exceeding the regulatory level of a Basic Nuclear Installation (INB)." (translated from ASN homepage, as of July 22, 2000)
Incidents at COGEMA/SICN nuclear fuel plant
SICN fuel plant events (ASN - in French)
INB No. 98, 63
Information about FBFC plant (Nuclear Safety Authority - ASN, in French)
Violation of criticality rules at FBFC nuclear fuel fabrication plant
On April 10, 2012, the FBFC nuclear fuel fabrication plant declared a significant event, when the permissible amount of enriched UO2F2 powder was exceeded in a vacuum cleaner - presenting a criticality hazard.
The event was rated Level 1 of the INES scale.
(ASN April 12, 2012)
Uranium-containing slurries detected in rainwater collection system of FBFC Romans nuclear fuel fabrication plant
On Nov. 12, 2009, Areva notified the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) of the detection of uranium-containing slurries in the rainwater collection system of its FBFC nuclear fuel fabrication plant in Romans-sur-Isère. The origin of the slurries predates the separation of the rainwater collection system from the process waste water systems at the plant. The uranium concentrations found do not present a criticality hazard. There was no impact on workers nor the environment outside the plant.
The incident was rated INES 1.
(ASN Nov. 17, 2009)
Leak detected in sewage system of FBFC Romans nuclear fuel fabrication plant
On July 17, 2008, Areva notified the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) of a break of an underground sewage system for uranium-containing liquids at its FBFC nuclear fuel fabrication plant in Romans-sur-Isère. An inspection held by ASN the same night reveiled that the rupture had occured years ago (!). Areva is currently busy cleaning up the contaminated area. ASN provisionally rated the event INES 1.
(ASN July 18, 2008)
> Download detailed report about the incident by independent laboratory CRIIRAD: Commentaires sur l’incident du 17 juillet 2008: détection d’une fuite sur une canalisation à l’usine FBFC-CERCA (AREVA) de Romans-sur-Isère, Note CRIIRAD N°08-149 (July 21, 2008, PDF - in French)
FBFC Romans nuclear fuel fabrication plant applies for capacity increase
FBFC - Framatome ANP's fuel subsidiary - has applied for a licence to expand capacity at its Romans fabrication plant. The company's current licence for the Romans plant limits it to 1200 tU in conversion (UF6 to UO2) and 820 tU in pelletizing and assembly. The licence application submitted would increase those limits to 1800 tU for conversion and 1400 tU for pelletizing and finishing operations. FBFC is modernizing the plant to meet new safety and radiation protection standards, partly through the use of more automated processes. (WNA News Briefing 04.05, Feb. 4, 2004)
Incidents at FBFC nuclear fuel fabrication plant
On Oct. 27, 2009, a small spill of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) occured at a conversion kiln.
(ASN Nov. 2, 2009)
On June 3, 2008, the rules to prevent criticality were violated in the pelletizing workshop. Scrap UO2 material was held in waste containers exceeding the safe mass limit. The event was classified INES 1. (ASN June 20, 2008)
On Nov. 16, 2007, ENUSA (Spain) detected traces of leaked UO2 powder at some containers received from FBFC Romans. The event was classified INES 1.
On May 17, 2004, the rules to prevent criticality were violated: in the conversion plant, the UF6 feed was not interrupted, although the monitoring equipment for the humidity contained in the UO2 powder product was not functioning. However, no criticality occured. The event was classified INES 1.
On July 22, 2003, the rules to prevent criticality were violated: twice the licensed amount of uranium-235 was stored in a cask. No criticality occured. The event was classified INES 1.
On Feb. 21, 2003, the rules to prevent criticality were violated: a cask containing 41 kilograms of enriched uranium powder was stored in an area where only 27 kilograms were permitted. However, no criticality occured. The event was classified INES 1.
Aerial view: Google Maps 
INB No. 93
Information about Tricastin plant (Nuclear Safety Authority - ASN, in French)
> See also: DU exports of Eurodif's enrichment facility (France) · Upgrading of French enrichment tails in Russia
> See also: Tails Deconversion - Usine W, Pierrelatte, Drôme, France
> See also: Cogéma's Depleted Uranium Storage Project (France)
> See also: COGEMA EURODIF Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant project, Tricastin (Drôme)
Public inquiry on cleaning phase at Eurodif gaseous diffusion enrichment plant at Tricastin
On Dec. 19, 2011, Areva announced that a public inquiry will be held until Jan. 20, 2012, on the license amendment request to perform the cleaning phase at the Eurodif gaseous diffusion enrichment plant.
> Download related avis (Vaucluse - in French)
> View related documents (Areva - in French)
Eurodif gaseous diffusion enrichment plant at Tricastin to be closed in 2012 and dismantled
Eurodif's gaseous diffusion plant at Tricastin will be closed in 2012: after a five-month period of progressive shut down of the machines, the complete shut down is expected in October 2012.
In the subsequent cleaning phase, chlorine trifluoride will be injected into the machines to remove residual uranium. This will allow the recovery of 300 tonnes of uranium and reduce the radiation levels of the machines.
In the dismantling phase following from 2016, 130,000 tonnes of contaminated steel will have to be managed. Areva hopes to achieve a contamination level below 100 Bq/g, for the steel can be disposed at ANDRA's low-level radioactive waste site.
The decommissioning cost so far has been announced as Euro 600 million, but Areva now has re-evaluated the cost at Euro 725 million. The trade unions, though, talk about billions of Euros.
(Le Dauphiné Libéré Sep. 16, 2011)
UF6 cylinder heated at Eurodif plant without connection to installations
On Aug. 8, 2011, a UF6 cylinder was heated at the Eurodif enrichment plant site for unloading, without being connected to the installations. The cylinder - a thin-wall model not suitable for transport purposes - contained depleted uranium hexafluoride that was to be transfered to a standard cylinder model. The pressure inside the cylinder did not exceed specifications and no UF6 was released.
The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Aug. 8, 2011)
Faulty locking device at overpack of UF6 cylinder in yard of Eurodif enrichment plant - again
On July 19, 2011, in the yard of the Eurodif enrichment plant, an open locking device was found at the overpack of a cylinder loaded with liquid uranium hexafluoride, awaiting solidification of the contents.
The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN July 22, 2011)
Workers on strike at Eurodif enrichment plant
About 50 employees are on strike at Eurodif's Tricastin enrichment plant to protest against a reorganization of their work.
(Le Parisien July 12, 2011)
UF6 container overfilled at Eurodif enrichment plant
On May 27, 2011, a container has been slightly overfilled with enriched UF6 product at the Eurodif enrichment plant in Tricastin. Eurodif has proposed to rate this event level 1 on the INES scale.
(Midi Libre, May 30, 2011)
The authorized limit of 430 kg in the cristallisator was exceeded by 14 kg; the safety limit of 543 kg was not reached.
(ASN June 1, 2011)
Faulty locking devices at overpack of UF6 cylinders
On March 25, 2011, ASN was notified by Areva that locking devices of overpacks of cylinders carrying natural and/or enriched uranium hexafluoride had inadvertently opened during transport in three cases in 2010 and 2011. Although the American designer of the locks had modified them in view of these incidents, Areva failed to implement these modifications. The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
> View ASN Avis d'indident May 12, 2011 [in French]
EURODIF enrichment plant to continue operation until end 2012
The EURODIF enrichment plant that had been scheduled for shutdown end 2010, will continue operation until end 2012, according to industry minister Eric Besson.
(Les Echos Nov. 24, 2010)
Iran's stake in EURODIF enrichment plant called into question by U.N. sanctions
U.N. Security Council resolution 1929 , adopted in June, bans the sale of any stakes in uranium mines to Iran, as well as shares in any commercial operations linked to the production of nuclear materials or technology. It also says that "all states shall prohibit such investment."
Council diplomats told Reuters that the latest steps clearly ban the sale of new stakes to Iran but are less clear on whether any previously held Iranian stakes in uranium mines or other nuclear-related operations should be divested.
(The Namibian Oct. 19, 2010)
Iran owns a 10% stake in Eurodif through its 40% stake in SOFIDIF.
> See also: Iran's stake in Rössing uranium mine causing headaches in view of U.N. santions (Namibia)
Crystallizer overfilled at Eurodif enrichment plant - again
On 27 Mar. 2010, following an alert from a gauge at a crystallizer of the Pierrelatte plant, Eurodif noted an excess amount of product in this receptacle, approx. 30 kgs above the 700 kg operational limit. The safety limit of 1485 kgs has never been attained. The crystallizer serves to separate the uranium hexafluoride from other unwanted gases present in the diffusion installation.
The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Apr. 1, 2010)
Crystallizer overfilled at Eurodif enrichment plant
On 24 Feb. 2010, following an alert from a gauge at a crystallizer of the Pierrelatte plant, Eurodif noted an excess amount of product in this receptacle, approx. 30 kgs above the 700 kg operational limit. The safety limit of 1485 kgs has never been attained. The crystallizer serves to separate the uranium hexafluoride from other unwanted gases present in the diffusion installation.
The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Mar. 15, 2010)
Violation of criticality rules at Eurodif enrichment plant
On Jan. 29, 2009, inspectors of the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) found that four barrels with fissile waste material were inadequately stored. No criticality occured. The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
(Areva Feb. 3, 2009; ASN Feb. 11, 2009)
Tricastin nuclear site partly flooded
In the early morning of Dec. 15, 2008, a rapid rise of the Gaffière river crossing the Tricastin site led to partial flooding of several installations on the site, in particular the SOCATRI facilities. Areva subsidiary Société auxiliaire du Tricastin (SOCATRI) operates an effluent treatment plant mainly for the Eurodif enrichment plant. The water level rise was caused by heavy precipitation and water regulation measures of upstream dams.
(ASN Dec. 15, 2008)
French wine appellation "Coteaux du Tricastin" wins name change after uranium spill
A French wine that shared its name with a nearby problem-plagued nuclear power plant on Wednesday (June 9, 2010) won the right to change its designation.
The Tricastin wines of southern France will now be known as the Grignan-Les Adhemar, according to a ruling from the powerful Inao agency tasked with regulating French agricultural products.
The decision capped a two-year campaign by wine producers to change the wine's official designation after a series of minor accidents at the Tricastin nuclear plant made headlines in 2008.
The decision will not come into effect immediately as there is a two-month period during which any opponent of the ruling can come forward.
Despite several soil and water tests that confirmed there was no radiation poisoning in the vineyards from the 2008 accident, the Tricastin wines never managed to recover. Production has dropped 40 per cent over the past two years.
(AFP June 9, 2010)
An appellation in the south of France is looking to change its name in order to avoid being associated with a uranium leak at a nuclear power station in the same region.
The Coteaux du Tricastin appellation, which neighbours Côtes du Rhône Villages, has resented its association with Tricastin Nuclear Power Centre for some time.
Henri Bour, head of the Coteaux du Tricastin appellation, told French news website nouvelobs.com that the region has wanted to change its name 'for about ten years'.
The push for a name change follows the intense media coverage of a uranium leak at the Tricastin nuclear site earlier this month.
'Now, it's useless for a producer to try to sell a bottle of Coteaux du Tricastin - people would laugh in their face,' said Brice Eymard, head of the economic department at the Rhône wine trade body, InterRhône.
A meeting of the administrative appellation council is set for 5 August, where members will discuss the possibility of changing the name Tricastin to Grignan, a local village in the center of the region.
(Decanter July 24, 2008)
Uranium-containing waste liquid spills at Tricastin nuclear site
During the night of July 7, 2008, 30 cubic meters of liquid containing 12 grams of uranium per litre (totalling 360 kg of uranium), spilled for unknown reasons from a holding tank at the effluent treatment plant of the Tricastin nuclear site. The effluents seeped into the soil and partly reached the "la Gaffière" river, and then the "le Lauzon" river. The resulting uranium concentration in the "la Gaffière" river was measured at approx. 1000 times normal background.
The effluent treatment plant is operated by Areva subsidiary Société auxiliaire du Tricastin (SOCATRI), mainly for the Eurodif enrichment plant.
(ASN July 8, 2008)
On July 11, 2008, in a rare move, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) ordered the shutdown of SOCATRI's uranium effluent treatment plant (STEU). At an inspection held on July 10, 2008, ASN had found that the measures taken to prevent any further spills are not satisfactory and that the information given by the licensee to the authority was incomplete. ASN further announced to sue the licensee for the deficiencies identified.
From the announcements made, it is unclear whether the shutdown will have any impacts on the operation of Eurodif's enrichment plant.
On July 16, 2008, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) announced that groundwater and surface water monitoring results had returned to normal except for two locations. Apparently, these higher values are not related to the recent spill, however. A recently completed IRSN study had already identified a few locations with elevated uranium concentrations in groundwater, the source of which has not yet been identified.
On June 17, 2010, the public prosecutor's office requested an EUR 100,000 penalty against Areva's subsidiary SOCATRI and the shutdown of the litigious section of the plant.
(Le Monde June 17, 2010)
The Tribunal de Grande Instance of Carpentras (Vaucluse) has ruled that SOCATRI is not guilty of water pollution, but it has imposed a EUR 40,000 penalty for neglect to notify the authorities of the accident immediately.
(Le Figaro Oct. 14, 2010)
Appeals court finds Areva guilty of 2008 uranium spill in Tricastin and imposes 300,000 EUR fine:
Socatri, a subsidiary company of Areva, was found guilty Thursday (Sep. 29) of the offence of "discharge of toxic substances in groundwater" after a uranium spill in July 2008.
In its order, the Court of Appeal of Nîmes condemned Socatri to a fine of 300,000 Euros, and to the payment of 20,000 Euros of damages to each association among the plaintiffs, including Sortir du Nucléaire, Amis de la Terre, Greenpeace and France Nature. In addition, Socatri will have to pay 10,000 Euros to ten residents.
(Le Monde Sep. 30, 2011)
> See also related information from
Public enquiry into abatement of flooding hazard at Areva's Tricastin site
Areva intends to perform protective measures against the flooding hazard in case of heavy precipitation at the Tricastin site, in particular from the Gaffière creek crossing the site and from a canal next to the site.
From Feb. 18, to March 21, 2008, the project is subject of a public enquiry held in the surrounding communities.
(Areva Feb. 18, 2008)
Unexpected criticality hazard found in Tricastin enrichment plant
During maintenance work, on Dec. 4, 2007, an unexpected deposit of uranyl fluoride (UO2F2) was detected inside a crystallization unit used to fill the enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into the product transport cylinders. The presence of uranyl fluoride in this unit had not been foreseen in the safety analysis of the plant. Such a deposit of uranyl fluoride might lead to a criticality event, in particular in the presence of water. A likely cause for the formation of the uranyl fluoride deposit was the entry of water into the equipment. The event was rated Level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN Dec. 11, 2007, Areva Dec. 6, 2007)
In July 2007, Areva presented a study performed by Institut National de l’Environnement Industriel et des Risques (INERIS) in March 2006 on possible health impacts of the operation of the nuclear facilities located at the Tricastin site, in particular the existing Georges Besse I and the future Georges Besse II enrichment plants, the Comurhex conversion plant, and the Socatri and Pierrelatte nuclear fuel facilities. The study investigated only the hazards for residents, limited to the hazards from chemical toxicity occuring during regular operation of the facilities. According to the study, none of the risks investigated are causing concern.
> Download Etude d’évaluation des risques sanitaires (ERS) (in French)
Évaluation des risques sanitaires liés au fonctionnement des établissements AREVA de la plateforme du Tricastin: usines Georges Besse I et II, SOCATRI, COGEMA Pierrelatte et COMURHEX (1er niveau d'approche), Bilan des études sanitaires, Rapport final, par Corinne MANDIN, Institut National de l’Environnement Industriel et des Risques (INERIS), Mars 2006
Regulator cites Eurodif for failure to report criticality-related event in enrichment plant
By letter dated March 29, 2007, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) demands an explanation from Eurodif, why the violation of a criticality-related criterion had not been reported to the authority. In January 2007, the boron concentration in the cooling water of the enrichment cascades had fallen below the permissible level. This might have resulted in a criticality excursion (an uncontrolled chain reaction accompanied by heavy radiation releases) in the plant.
While Eurodif restored the boron concentration upon discovery of the condition, Eurodif failed to report the event to ASN. This failure was only discovered by ASN during an inspection on March 26, 2007.
Kazatomprom to obtain share in French enrichment plant in exchange for uranium deliveries?
> See here
Elevated radiation found around Tricastin nuclear site
The independent radiation monitoring group CRII-RAD identified external radiation doses up to 20-fold above natural background at several locations around the Tricastin site of nuclear installations. The site comprises, among others, the Eurodif enrichment plant. CRII-RAD suggests that the source of the excess radiation observed is nuclear material stockpiled on site.
> View CRII-RAD release Oct 8, 2002 (in French)
> Download CRII-RAD monitoring results (PDF, in French)
France to abandon development of atomic vapour laser enrichment technology
Development of the Silva atomic vapour laser isotope separation process will cease by 2003, the Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA) announced. Instead, the CEA will resume R&D work on gas centrifuge enrichment technology that was suspended in 1983, when research efforts were focussed on laser enrichment technology. CEA Administrator General Pascal Colombani said that Silva proved 'difficult to implement and had an uncertain commercial future'. (UI News Briefing 01.07, Feb. 14, 2001)
Tricastin events (ASN, in French)
Areva suspends capacity increase at Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant
On Dec. 13, 2011, Areva announced the suspension of the capacity increase at the Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant at Tricastin.
(Le Monde Dec. 13, 2011)
Areva offers India stake in Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant
Global nuclear power major Areva is open to giving a minority stake in its uranium enrichment plant to Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL). Though a formal offer has not yet been made, a senior Areva executive said the two companies have held informal discussions on the proposal.
(Business Standard Dec. 18, 2010)
Georges Besse II enrichment plant inaugurated
The Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant was inaugurated on Dec. 14, 2010.
The plant's production capacity will now be increased by adding further modules. Full capacity is expected in 2016, two years ahead of schedule. It will have a production capacity of 7.5 million SWU (Separative Work Units), which could be increased to 11 million SWU.
(Areva Dec. 14, 2010)
Further Japanese companies acquire equity stake in Areva's Georges Besse II enrichment plant project
Tohoku Electric Power and Kyushu Electric Power will use the Japan France Enrichment Investing Company to acquire 2% of the outstanding shares in Société d'Enrichissement du Tricastin (SET) Holding. This means that the Japan France Enrichment Investing Company will come to hold 4.5% of SET Holding outstanding shares.
The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. and Sojitz Corporation previously announced on March 30, 2009 their official participation in a new uranium enrichment plant project advanced by AREVA NC of France. Under that plan, the companies worked through Kansai Sojitz Enrichment Investing (a joint venture formed with an equity breakdown of 80% by Kansai Electric and 20% by Sojitz) to acquire 2.5% of the outstanding shares of SET Holdings (a subsidiary of AREVA NC), with that deal completed on June 30, 2009.
(Asahi Nov. 4, 2010)
First cascade of Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant starts operation
On Dec. 9, 2009, Areva announced that it has started the operation of the first cascade of the Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant project.
Areva's Georges-Besse II uranium enrichment plant will dispose of section to enrich recycled uranium
According to a speaker of Electricité de France (EDF), the Georges-Besse II centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, currently under construction and to be completed by 2012, will provide the capability to enrich recycled uranium recovered from spent fuel.
(Le Monde Oct. 12, 2009)
Areva open to Georges-Besse II uranium enrichment plant investors - report
French nuclear group Areva is ready to welcome new investors in the capital of its Georges-Besse II (GB II) uranium enrichment plant, a senior manager told French newspaper Les Echos.
"We would be glad if Italy and Spain joined us, and we could also look elsewhere," said Francois-Xavier Rouxel, executive vice-president of Areva's enrichment business.
(Reuters July 21, 2009)
Korean utility acquires equity stake in Areva's Georges Besse II enrichment plant project
On June 15, 2009, Areva announced that it has signed an agreement with Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co. Ltd. (KHNP) under which the South Korean utility is to take a 2.5% stake in the Société d'Enrichissement du Tricastin (SET) holding which operates the Georges Besse II enrichment plant. KHNP is a subsidiary of Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), a wholly government-owned corporation.
First centrifuge cascade of Georges Besse II uranium enrichment plant inaugurated
On May 18, 2009, the first centrifuge cascade of the Georges Besse II uranium enrichment plant was inaugurated, where production is set to commence this year.
(Areva)
Japanese companies acquire equity stake in AREVA's Georges Besse II enrichment plant project
On March 30, 2009, Areva announced that the Japanese corporations Kansai and Sojitz have signed an agreement with AREVA under which they will acquire a 2.5% share in the holding company of Société d'Enrichissement du Tricastin (SET), the operator of the Georges Besse II enrichment plant.
Areva accelerates domestic centrifuge enrichment plant project
Areva has made a decision to launch the construction of a second unit of the Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant project within a few weeks, rather than in 2012, as previously planned. The unit will have a capacity of 3.2 million SWU; the completion is now foreseen for 2016, rather than 2018.
(Les Echos Dec. 11, 2008)
Suez acquires an equity stake in Areva's new Georges Besse II centrifuge uranium enrichment plant
Suez and Areva have signed an agreement giving Suez 5% ownership interest in the company that holds the Georges Besse II uranium enrichment plant.
Suez, through its Energy Services business line, is building the electrical installations, and supplying the fluid management systems and the HVAC and process cooling equipment of the new plant, which is scheduled for startup in 2009.
With the agreement, Suez will be able to secure a portion of its nuclear reactor supply needs in enriched uranium.
Georges Besse II is one of France's largest current industrial investments, representing a total of close to EUR 3 billion.
(Suez/Areva Jun. 3, 2008)
Areva presents study on health risks for residents from operation of nuclear facilities at the Tricastin site
> View here
Construction commences at Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant
Construction of the first section of the Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant has commenced. First production is expected in 2009. (Le Dauphiné Libéré, 29 Oct. 2006)
Areva and Urenco announce creation of Joint Venture ETC (Enrichment Technology Company)
On July 3, 2006, Areva and Urenco signed the agreement to settle ETC (Enrichment Technology Company), the Joint Venture between Areva and Urenco in the field of uranium enrichment centrifuge technology.
The Joint Venture is now effective with the acquisition by Areva of a 50% equity stake in ETC. This opens the way for the construction of the new Georges Besse II enrichment plant.
(Areva July 3, 2006)
Kazatomprom to obtain share in French enrichment plant in exchange for uranium deliveries?
> See here
Dutch parliament to vote on agreement giving Areva access to Urenco's centrifuge enrichment technology
In March 2006, the lower house (Tweede Kamer) of the Durch parliament will vote on the Cardiff Agreement which will give Areva/Cogéma access to Urenco's centrifuge enrichment technology, while excluding access to classified design information. The agreement extends the 1970 Almelo Treaty which is the basis of the trilateral Urenco consortium. The agreement, while excluding the enrichment of uranium for nuclear bombs, would allow for the enrichment of uranium for France's nuclear navy.
In the United Kingdom, the Cardiff Agreement was presented to Parliament in October 2005 and ratified before the end of the year. (Nuclear Fuel Jan. 16, 2006)
The German government approved the Cardiff Agreement on October 15, 2005; involvement of parliament was not deemed necessary. (MdB Johannes Pflug, Feb. 15, 2006)
Agreement between the governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands regarding collaboration in centrifuge technology: Cardiff, 12 July 2005 (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office - 399k PDF)
European Commission approves Areva/Urenco centrifuge enrichment venture
On Oct. 6, 2004, the European Commission decided that French government-owned Areva may acquire a stake in Urenco's subsidiary Enrichment Technology Co Ltd (ETC). The approval was given on the condition that the companies would act independently on capacity increases, and that Euratom surveillance would be strengthened.
(Dow Jones Oct. 6, 2004)
COMMISSION DECISION of 06.10.2004 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No COMP/M.3099 – Areva/Urenco/ETC JV) (276k PDF)
Public Debate on Eurodif centrifuge enrichment plant project
From 1 September to 22 October 2004, a public debate was held in the departments of Drôme, Gard, Vaucluse, and Ardèche, neighbouring the planned centrifuge enrichment plant "Georges Besse II" in southern France.
Débat public sur le projet Georges Besse II (in French)
> Download: Le dossier du maître d'ouvrage (in French)
> See also: Communiqué du Réseau Sortir du nucléaire (1 Sep 2004) (in French)
European Commission extends probe into Areva/Urenco venture
The European Commission has launched a detailed investigation into Areva's proposed acquisition of a 50% stake in Enrichment Technology Company (ETC). At this stage, the Commission is concerned that the joint venture may result in less R&D with regards to centrifugation technology and lead to higher prices for enriched uranium used for fuel in nuclear power plants.
(European Commission June 22, 2004)
AREVA secures Urenco's gas centrifuge technology and launches new enrichment plant project
COGEMA's parent company AREVA Group signed an agreement with URENCO shareholders on Nov. 24, 2003, under which it will acquire a 50% equity interest in Enrichment Technology Company (ETC).
ETC comprises all of URENCO's centrifuge design and manufacturing activities as well as its R&D in the field of centrifuge equipment and installations for uranium enrichment to produce nuclear fuel.
A new enrichment plant, to be named Georges Besse II, will be built at the Tricastin site with a total investment around EUR 3 billion. Production capacity will be increased gradually starting in 2007 and reach its nominal level around 2016. The actual construction is expected to get under way in early 2005, once government authorizations have been obtained and relevant international treaties have been modified allowing AREVA to take an equity interest in ETC. This is supposed to be done in the 4th quarter of 2004.
(Areva Nov. 26, 2003)
COGEMA's parent company AREVA made a first step to abandon uranium enrichment by gaseous diffusion. In a Memorandum of Understanding, URENCO and AREVA have agreed to develop plans for working together in the field of centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment. The companies envisage a 50-50 joint venture to build a new centrifuge enrichment plant that would progessively replace the existing Tricastin plant capacity beginning from 2007.
(Areva/Les Echos Oct 9, 2002)
"COGEMA's enrichment subsidiary Eurodif, reportedly in partnership with Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute, is considering building a centrifuge enrichment facility at COGEMA's Tricastin site. Yves Coupin, head of COGEMA's uranium division, stated that additional centrifuge units would 'complement' the existing gaseous diffusion units and allow more flexibility in adjusting capacity to meet market demand. Coupin also said that initial SILVA capacity under the joint COGEMA/CEA laser enrichment research venture could come into operation before the end of next decade." (UI News Briefing 98.44, see also FreshFUEL 11/9/98 )
Aerial View: Google Maps
> See also: Comité Local d'Information et de Concertation (CLIC) Malvési (DREAL Languedoc-Roussillon - in French)
> See also: Plan de Prévention des Risques Technologiques (PPRT) Comurhex (DREAL Languedoc-Roussillon - in French)
> See also: Refluorination of depleted uranium oxide at Comurhex Malvési and Pierrelatte plants, France
Respirable uranium particles found on cypress leaves close to Comurhex Malvési uranium conversion plant
Uranium oxide and other airborne particles deposited on cypress leaves close to a nuclear facility , by Gieré R, Kaltenmeier R, Pourcelot L, in: Journal of Environmental Monitoring Vol. 14, No. 4, April 1, 2012, p. 1263-1273
Areva announces suspension of capacity increase at Malvési and Pierrelatte uranium conversion plants
On Dec. 13, 2011, Areva announced the suspension of the capacity increase at the Malvési and Pierrelatte uranium conversion plants.
(Le Monde Dec. 13, 2011)
Temporary shut down of Areva's Malvési and Pierrelatte uranium conversion plants for drop in demand after Fukushima disaster
French nuclear group Areva on Thursday (Sep. 15) said it would temporarily shut down two uranium conversion plants in France during November and December.
The temporary shutdown of the two plants, which employ around 570 staff, comes after a sharp fall in orders from Japanese nuclear power producers in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, said a spokeswoman at Areva.
The spokeswoman said the temporary shutdown would reduce estimated production to 10,880 tonnes in 2011, down from an initial goal of 13,400 tonnes for the full year.
The plants, which are owned by Areva's subsidiary Comurhex and are located in the southern French cities of Tricastin and Narbonne, chemically prepare uranium before its is enriched to become fuel for nuclear power plants.
(Reuters Sep. 15, 2011)
Nuclear Safety Authority finds that decantation basin which failed in 2004 at the Malvési conversion plant is not properly authorized, as it contains traces of artificial radionuclides; control over two basins withdrawn from Comurhex/Areva
On Dec. 22, 2009, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) has determined that the decantation and storage basins B1 and B2 at the Malvési conversion plant do constitute operations to be licensed as "installation nucléaire de base" (INB) rather than "installation classée pour la protection de l'environnement" (ICPE).
Basin B2 had failed on March 20, 2004, releasing approx. 30,000 cubic metres of liquid and slurries.
Comurhex was ordered to submit an application for an INB license by Dec. 31, 2010. In the meantime, control over the two basins has been withdrawn from Comurhex/Areva and is exercised by ASN directly.
(ASN Jan. 4, 2010)
ASN's determination is based on the fact that these two basins contain traces of artificial radionuclides that result from the practice of processing irradiated fuel in the facility until 1983.
(ASN presentation at CLIC Comurhex meeting of Jan. 29, 2010)
Release of fluorine to the canal du Tauran
On Aug. 24, 2009, Areva detected a release of fluorine to the canal du Tauran, exceeding the authorized limit.
(Areva Aug. 25, 2009)
The permissible releases of 5 kg/day of fluorine and 230 kg/day of ammonium were heavily exceeded:
- fluorine: release of 781 kg on 23 Aug. and 340 kg on 24 Aug. 2009
- ammonium: release of 962 kg on 23 Aug. and 370 kg on 24 Aug. 2009
On Aug. 25 and 26, 2009, an excessive mortality rate of fish was observed in the canal de Tauran.
(Compte rendu CLIC Malvési, Sep. 14, 2009)
On Dec. 16, 2011, Comurhex was condemned to 60,000 Euro in fines for water pollution at the Malvési plant between Aug. 21 and 25, 2009.
(L'Express Dec. 21, 2011)
Elevated uranium concentrations found in groundwater on site of Malvési conversion plant
During the course of the year 2008, uranium concentrations showed strong increases with peaks up to 1.2 milligrams per litre in two groundwater monitoring wells located on the site of the Malvési conversion plant.
Areva has to submit explanations on the cause of the increases and on possible impacts on off-site groundwater by end June 2009.
(DRIRE Languedoc Roussillon: Installations Classées, Contrôle du site COMURHEX, Bilan 2008; DRIRE Languedoc-Roussillon: Compte Rendu, Réunion du CLIC Narbonne, Séance du 21 avril 2009)
Elevated contaminant concentrations found in surface waters near Malvési conversion plant after thunderstorm
After a thunderstorm on January 24, 2009, elevated concentrations of nitrate and uranium were found in surface waters near the Malvési conversion plant. There occured no overflow from the storage basins located on site.
(Areva Comurhex: Bilan annuel de fonctionnement, CLIC du 21 avril 2009)
Uranium concentration in surface waters near Malvési conversion plant exceeds WHO drinking water guidance
In a report released Sep. 24, 2008, Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) discloses some environmental impacts of the Malvési conversion plant, in particular to surface waters outside the site, with uranium concentrations in excess of WHO's drinking water guidance value of 15 micrograms per litre. The artificial onsite pond contains average uranium concentrations of 110 micrograms per litre, with maximum values of 200 micrograms per litre at some locations.
> Download Etat de la surveillance environnementale et bilan du marquage des nappes phréatiques et des cours d’eau autour des sites nucléaires et des entreposages anciens de déchets radioactifs, 15 septembre 2008 (3.1MB PDF - in French)
Railcar with Yellow Cake shipment for Malvési conversion plant overloaded
A railcar carrying uranium ore concentrate from the Hamburg harbour (Germany) to the Comurhex conversion plant at Malvési was found to be overloaded when entering France at Apach. The railcar carried 68 t rather than the permitted 61 t.
(Saarbrücker Zeitung Aug. 13, 2008)
Leaking Yellow Cake container arrives at Comurhex Malvési uranium conversion plant
On July 26, 2007, a small spill of Yellow Cake was detected during the unloading of a container from a railcar at Comurhex's Malvési conversion plant. The container held 36 barrels of natural uranium concentrate (Yellow Cake) produced in Niger. It turned out that one of the uranium barrels was damaged and around 30 kg of Yellow Cake had spilled inside the container. Traces of spilled uranium were also found on the ship that had carried the container before the rail transport. The event was rated Level 1 of the INES scale.
(ASN Aug. 9, 2007)
Areva increases capacity at Comurhex Malvési conversion plant
On May 21, 2007, Areva announced that it is to spend EUR 240 million to build new facilities and expand existing facilities at its Comurhex Malvési conversion plant. First industrial production is scheduled for 2012, based on 15,000 metric tons of uranium per year. This figure may be increased to 21,000 tons to meet market requirements.
CRIIRAD finds unexpected radionuclide concentrations in slurries at Comurhex Malvési plant
On Nov. 14, 2006, the independent radiation laboratory CRIIRAD released a report giving the results of a radiation survey conducted at the Malvési conversion plant on Sep. 21 and 22, 2006. The slurries contained unexpected high concentrations of thorium-230, which might lead to inacceptable radiation doses from inhalation. Moreover, the artificial nuclide americium-241 was identified, probably caused from former processing of recycled uranium.
> Download related CRIIRAD documents
IRSN demands cleanup of soil contaminated from spills at Comurhex Malvési plant
On July 25, 2006, the Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) performed a radiation survey of areas outside the Comurhex Malvési plant. It turned out that several areas were contaminated from uranium decay products (Th-234 and Pa-234m in particular) released during spills. IRSN demands the cleanup of those areas.
(Compte rendu d'intervention, IRSN, Oct. 2006)
New spill of slurries at Malvési conversion plant went undetected for one month
On June 20, 2006, a spill of an unreported amount of contaminated slurries occured from leaking pipework connecting decantation basin B5 with the treatment plant for the supernatant liquids. The spill covered a surface area of 350 square meters and was only detected on July 19, 2006.
(Compte rendu, Comité Local d'Information et de Concertation, Séance du 24 Juillet 2006 à Narbonne)
Production halted at Malvési conversion plant after new spill and for decantation pond dam failure hazard after heavy rain
On January 30, 2006, Comurhex had to halt parts of its production at Malvési due to heavy rainfall in the area. According to a Comurhex press release, the production halt was a preventive measure necessary to maintain a safety margin in the plant's effluent decantation ponds.
(Comurhex Jan. 30, 2006)
However, during heavy rain on Jan. 28 - 30, 2006, precipitation came into contact with the slurries still lying outside of the B2 dam broken in 2004 (according to Comurhex, bad weather had prevented the reconstruction of the dam). An unspecified amount of the contaminated liquid (carrying high loads of nitrate) then spilled into the canal of Tauran.
(Compte-rendu du CLIC Malvési, Comurhex-Narbonne, 16 février 2006)
On March 5, 2006, strong winds resulted in an overflow of several decantation ponds due to insufficient safety margins of the ponding water levels, leading to another spill of an unspecified amount of nitrate-contaminated waters to the canal of Tauran. During the period from end-January to mid-April, the amount of nitrate released by Comurhex (297 t NO3) was six times higher than in a complete year without incidents (46 t NO3). The release of uranium during that period (75 kg U) was only slightly higher than in a complete normal year (63 kg U).
(Compte-rendu du CLIC Malvési, Comurhex-Narbonne, 22 mai 2006; AREVA: CLIC du 22/05/06: Bilan des intempéries, Actions d’amélioration)
Production was resumed on April 1, 2006.
Dam failure of decantation pond at Malvési conversion plant
On March 20, 2004, a dam failure at decantation and evaporation pond B2 of the Malvési conversion plant released approx. 30,000 cubic metres of liquid and slurries. The liquid contained high concentrations of nitrate and led to elevated nitrate concentrations of up to 170 mg/L in the canal of Tauran for several weeks, while uranium concentrations remained unchanged. The dam failure is believed to be caused by an "abnormal presence of water" due to heavy rain in summer 2003. (Rapport environnemental, social et sociétal 2004, COMURHEX Malvési)
> View details
Derailment of railway car carrying uranium ore concentrates
On September 23, 2001, a railway car carrying 30 tonnes of uranium ore concentrates derailed at the Courbessac shunting yard near Nîmes (Gard) in Southern France. The uranium obviously originated from Niger. It was shipped via Benin and Britanny to the Comurhex conversion plant at Malvési near Narbonne (Aude). No uranium was spilled. (Midi Libre Sep 25, 2001)
Fire on railway car carrying uranium ore concentrates
On June 8, 2000, a beginning fire was detected on a railway car carrying uranium ore concentrate (magnesium uranate) from Niger to Malvési. The fire was noticed at the entry of the Chantenay station (near Nantes) and the train was stopped. Fire brigades extinguished the fire within minutes. (ASN)
Aerial view: Google Maps
INB No. 105
Information about Comurhex plant (Nuclear Safety Authority - ASN, in French)
> See also: Refluorination of depleted uranium oxide at Comurhex Malvési and Pierrelatte plants, France
Uranium hexafluoride cylinders mixed up at Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant
On April 29, 2012, a mixup of identification numbers led to the use of the wrong UF6 cylinder for a recurring test at the Comurhex conversion plant in Pierrelatte. The bar code reader meant to prevent such mixup was out of service at the time, and the double checking of the identification numbers prescribed in this case had not taken place. The event had no immediate impacts. The event was rated level 1 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).
(ASN May 15, 2012)
Areva announces suspension of capacity increase at Malvési and Pierrelatte uranium conversion plants
> View here
Dose rate at boundary of Areva's Pierrelatte conversion plant exceeds 1 mSv standard
The dose rate at the boundary of Areva's Pierrelatte conversion plant exceeds the 1 mSv per year standard at two locations. This became apparent as Areva is now using more sensitive films in the dosimeters placed at the site perimeter. As there is nobody living at the site perimeter, no residents were exposed to excess radiation doses.
(ASN Oct. 20, 2011)
Temporary shut down of Areva's Malvési and Pierrelatte uranium conversion plants for drop in demand after Fukushima disaster
> View here
Study finds elevated uranium levels in groundwater near Tricastin nuclear site partly caused by former site activities
A study conducted by IRSN after the 2008 incident at Socatri concluded that the uranium levels in excess of WHO's 15 µg/L drinking water guidance found in the alluvial groundwater of the community of Bollène are probably linked to the former activity of the nuclear site, while the levels found at the community of Lapalud are of natural origin.
> View IRSN release Sep. 17, 2010 (in French)
> Download report Etude sur l'origine du marquage par l'uranium dans la nappe alluviale de la plaine du Tricastin , DEI/2010-004, Direction de l'Environnement et de l'Intervention, IRSN 2010 (34.5MB PDF - in French)
Release of fluorine and nitrogen at Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant
On May 10, 2010, a gaseous release of fluorine and nitrogen occured at a non-nuclear section of the Comurhex Pierrelatte facility. The release caused no injuries nor impacts on the exterior of the site.
(Areva May 20, 2010)
Nuclear Safety Authority condemns poor management of Areva/Comurhex Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant
"[...] In view of this examination, the inspectors consider that the rigour of exploitation and the conformity of the INB No. 105 appears very insufficient in comparison with the regulation. In spite of a low risk presented by the installations, the management of those is regarded as unsatisfactory. The reference frame of safety of the INB No. 105 does not correspond at the real state of the installations. In addition, the management of the modifications and consignments is not based on a formalized reference frame. Periodicities of certain controls periodicals are not respected and others are not carried out. Lastly, certain wastes stored in area No. 61 do not present a satisfying containment and the conditions of storage do not respect the commitments made by the owner to limit the consequences of possible flooding. Three notable reports were raised at the end of this inspection. [...]" (ASN Nov. 27, 2009, emphasis added)
> Download ASN Lettre de suite d'inspection, Usine de préparation d'hexaflorure d'uranium - COMURHEX, Inspection du : 18/11/2009, Nov. 27, 2009 (PDF - in French)
Uranium concentration in groundwater near Pierrelatte conversion plant exceeds WHO drinking water guidance
In a report released Sep. 24, 2008, Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) discloses that groundwater south of the Pierrelatte conversion plant contains uranium concentrations in excess of WHO's drinking water guidance value of 15 micrograms per litre. Due to the proximity of various other nuclear facilities at the Tricastin site, the origin of these values remains to be determined.
> Download Etat de la surveillance environnementale et bilan du marquage des nappes phréatiques et des cours d’eau autour des sites nucléaires et des entreposages anciens de déchets radioactifs, 15 septembre 2008 (3.1MB PDF - in French)
Uranium leak in sewage system of Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant
On Aug. 22, 2008, Areva reported a minor leak in the sewage system of the Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant. The amount of uranium escaped is believed to be on the order of 250 grams.
Areva presents study on health risks for residents from operation of nuclear facilities at the Tricastin site
> View here
Areva increases capacity at Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant
On May 21, 2007, Areva announced that it is to spend EUR 370 million to build new facilities at its Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant. First industrial production is scheduled for 2012, based on 15,000 metric tons of uranium per year. This figure may be increased to 21,000 tons to meet market requirements.
Uranium spill at Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant
On December 3, 2003, about 150 grams of uranium were inadvertently released into the rainwater collection system of the Comurhex Pierrelatte plant.
> View ASN release, Jan. 28, 2004 (in French)
ASN cites Comurhex on deficiencies at Pierrelatte conversion plant
On Oct. 29, 2003, the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) issued a citation to Comurhex on deficiencies regarding fire prevention at its Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant.
> View ASN release Oct. 29, 2003 (in French)
> Download ASN citation Oct. 29, 2003 (PDF - in French)
Pierrelatte uranium conversion plant flooded
During the night from 19 to 20 October, 2001, a water leakage flooded the Comurhex uranium conversion plant at Pierrelatte. The plant was not in operation at that time. The water became contaminated with traces of residual uranium from the floor and the walls of the facility. A part (approximately 200 cubic meters) of the contaminated water flowed into the surroundings of the building. The maximum uranium concentration found in the water was 2 milligrams per litre. The event was rated Level 1 of the INES scale. (ASN 31 Oct 2001)
A total of 100,000 casks containing low-level radioactive waste from the Comurhex uranium conversion plant at Pierrelatte in Southern France have been dumped in a domestic waste deposit in the nearby community of Solérieux (Drôme dept.). In the Pierrelatte plant, Comurhex, a COGEMA subsidiary, is converting UF4 to UF6 for later enrichment in the Eurodif plant. The wastes consist of calcium fluorine, contaminated with uranium. The amount of wastes dumped was 1000 tonnes per year.
After the situation had been made public by MP Michèle Rivasi, Comurhex decided to stop dumping at Solérieux and to keep the wastes on site at Pierrelatte for intermediate storage, until a proposed national low-level waste facility will be operable in 2002.
Sources: Le Monde 22 Jul 1999, Nuclear Fuel 26 July 1999, dpa 3 Aug 1999
> View map (ANDRA)
Incidents at Comurhex Pierrelatte conversion plant
Comurhex Pierrelatte events (ASN - in French)
INB No. 155
Information about TU5 plant (Nuclear Safety Authority - ASN, in French)
50,000 tonnes of depleted uranium oxide in use at Tricastin to shield radiation from 7,360 tonnes of stored reprocessed uranium oxide
In wake of the Fukushima disaster, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) requested operators of nuclear facilities to prepare supplemental safety reports to assess various natural hazards. In its report on the Tricastin site, Areva made an amazing disclosure: the product storage area P18 of the TU5 uranyl nitrate conversion facility holds 7,360 tonnes of reprocessed U3O8 in 213-Liter barrels, while approximately 50,000 tonnes of depleted U3O8 are used as a biological shield at the periphery of the storage area.
For comparison: the Bessines depleted uranium oxide storage facility has a capacity of 199,900 t.
So, one may wonder whether the closure of the nuclear fuel cycle actually is a viable option, if the safe storage of the recycled product requires such an absurdly massive shielding. After all, the uranium has to be processed further to be recycled into nuclear fuel...
Or, is this just an undeclared on-site storage facility for depleted uranium oxide of the adjacent Usine W depleted uranium deconversion plant? After all, the Bessines depleted uranium oxide storage facility is almost full and would not have sufficient space left to store this amount.
> Access Evaluation complémentaire de la sûreté des installations nucléaires de base, Site du Tricastin, Areva, Septembre 2011 , p. 86 (ASN - in French)
Faulty locking devices at overpack of UF6 cylinders
On March 25, 2011, ASN was notified by Areva that locking devices of overpacks of cylinders carrying natural and/or enriched uranium hexafluoride had inadvertently opened during transport in three cases in 2010 and 2011. Although the American designer of the locks had modified them in view of these incidents, Areva failed to implement these modifications. The event was rated level 1 on the INES scale.
> View ASN Avis d'indident May 12, 2011 [in French]
Areva presents study on health risks for residents from operation of nuclear facilities at the Tricastin site
> View here
Criticality rules violated at TU5 conversion facility
On June 30, 2006, Areva notified the Nuclear Safety Authority ASN that concentrations of uranium-235 in excess of the licensed 1% had been found in several drums. On July 18, 2006, ASN ordered Areva to take urgent measures to assure the licensed level in all drums.
(ASN July 18, 2006)
Explosion in TU5 conversion facility
On March 16, 2002, a 200-litre tank of low-level liquid radioactive waste exploded at Cogéma's Pierrelatte TU5 conversion facility. An investigation done by the Nuclear Safety Authority ASN revealed two handling errors which had led to the mixing of chemically incompatible liquids in the tank. The explosion caused no injuries and no releases to the environment. The event was classified level 1 on the INES scale.
(ASN April 10, 2002)
The plant processes recycled uranium from the La Hague reprocessing plant from the chemical form of UO2(NO3)2 (uranyl nitrate) into U3O8.
